“The Animal, Whatever It Was”: Dogs, Multi-Species Subjectivity, And The Signifier Guide In Go Down, Moses, And The Call Of The Wild by NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University & Wharton, Joshua Daniel
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“THE ANIMAL, WHATEVER IT WAS”: DOGS, MULTI-SPECIES SUBJECTIVITY, 
AND THE SIGNIFIER GUIDE IN GO DOWN, MOSES AND THE CALL OF THE WILD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
by 
JOSHUA WHARTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School 
 at Appalachian State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2018 
Department of English 
 
 
 
 
  
	  
 
 
“THE ANIMAL, WHATEVER IT WAS”: DOGS, MULTI-SPECIES SUBJECTIVITY, 
AND THE SIGNIFIER GUIDE IN GO DOWN, MOSES AND THE CALL OF THE WILD 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis  
by 
JOSHUA WHARTON 
December 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY:  
  
 
        
Zackary Vernon, Ph.D. 
Chairperson, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Jessica Martell, Ph.D. 
Member, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Chris Mead, Ph.D. 
Member, Thesis Committee 
 
 
        
Tammy Wahpeconiah, Ph.D. 
Chairperson, Department of English 
 
 
        
Mike McKenzie, Ph.D. 
Dean, Cratis D. Williams School of Graduate Studies 
  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by Joshua Wharton 2018 
All Rights Reserve
	  iv	  
Abstract 
 
“THE ANIMAL, WHATEVER IT WAS”: DOGS, MULTI-SPECIES SUBJECTIVITY, 
AND THE SIGNIFIER GUIDE IN GO DOWN, MOSES AND THE CALL OF THE WILD 
 
Joshua Wharton 
B.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Zackary Vernon, Ph.D. 
 
 
	   Whom	  or	  what	  do	  we	  write	  about	  when	  we	  write	  about	  dogs?	  This	  thesis	  
attempts	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  in	  part	  by	  analyzing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  dogs	  have	  been	  
reductively	  represented	  in	  literature,	  particularly	  in	  wilderness	  narratives	  that	  tend	  to	  
mistake	  nature	  and	  culture	  as	  separate	  spaces.	  The	  two	  narratives	  I	  focus	  on	  to	  
demonstrate	  this	  argument	  are	  William	  Faulkner’s	  Go	  Down,	  Moses	  (1942),	  and	  Jack	  
London’s	  The	  Call	  of	  the	  Wild	  (1903).	  I	  begin	  with	  establishing	  the	  opposite	  poles	  that	  
various	  texts	  seem	  to	  gravitate	  toward	  when	  portraying	  animals.	  On	  one	  end,	  we	  often	  
read	  texts	  that	  sentimentalize,	  mythologize,	  or	  anthropomorphize	  animals.	  On	  the	  
opposite	  end,	  texts	  err	  on	  the	  side	  of	  stressing	  scientific	  observation	  to	  the	  point	  that	  
the	  human	  is	  detached	  from	  nonhuman	  animals.	  Faulkner’s	  text	  seems	  to	  emulate	  the	  
former	  and	  London’s	  the	  latter.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  narratives	  deny	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  
animals	  and	  their	  lived	  experience.	  The	  consequences	  of	  misrepresenting	  animals	  in	  
literature	  are	  far	  reaching,	  extending	  at	  times	  to	  the	  way	  humans	  end	  up	  being	  treated.	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  The	  Call	  of	  the	  Wild	  and	  Go	  Down	  Moses,	  the	  way	  dog	  characters	  are	  
represented	  mirrors	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  Native	  American	  characters.	  Dogs	  and	  
	  v	  
Native	  Americans	  seem	  to	  textually	  converge	  in	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  signifier	  guide,	  the	  
object-­‐‑tool	  through	  which	  privileged	  characters	  are	  able	  to	  transcend	  their	  cultural	  
trappings	  into	  a	  more	  “natural”	  existence.	  This	  transcendence	  usually	  occurs	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  the	  guide’s	  life	  or	  well	  being.	  This	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  problematizing	  this	  type	  
of	  dog	  story	  and	  concludes	  by	  offering	  potential	  alternatives	  for	  more	  productively	  
writing	  about	  dogs	  in	  literature.	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 1 
Introduction 
In October of 2018, Frontiers in Neuroscience published a study entitled 
“Awake fMRI reveals Brain Regions for Novel Word Detection in Dogs”. In this 
study, researchers from Emory University, New College, and Comprehensive Pet 
Therapy underwent the process of scanning the brains of dogs during word 
processing tasks in order to see the degree to which dogs actually recognize the 
words we use. Many of us know, or are perhaps ourselves, people that truly 
believe our dogs understand the words that we say in a way similar to our 
understanding. This study sought, in part, to discern scientifically the degree to 
which those assumptions might be true. Essentially, they wanted to know how 
dogs recognize words and what exactly constitutes a word to a dog. The 
researchers actually found that dog’s brains react in an almost opposite way than 
human brains when approached with an unknown, made up word, or pseudoword. 
When observed through an fMRI scanner, Human brains show much more 
activity in response to known words, whereas dogs show more activity when 
hearing a pseudoword. While the study gives many possible reasons for this, each 
of these reasons begin with the assumption that dogs care about associating 
unknown sounds with known. 
From this evidence, we can assume to a degree that dogs seem to care 
about what the humans they associate with say. Of course, they could care for a 
number of reasons ranging from the impetus to seek affirmation to the desire for 
reward. Conversely, most of us also care about understanding our dogs. Studies 
such as this show that people care enough to spend resources in figuring out the 
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degree to which verbal communication is possible. One question the study does 
not answer, however, concerns the way humans and dogs work out the 
relationship between the signifier and signified. As the introduction to the study 
points out, connecting the sound of a verb to an action does not mean the same 
thing as the mental response humans have when thinking of all the images and 
ideas a word can signify. 
In regards to this difference, I wonder if we have considered the degree to 
which our understanding of what the word “dog” signifies to us has factored into 
decisions that make these studies possible. Do we see dogs as physically 
embodied subjects, or do we view them through a lens of ontological 
categorization? To what degree does the ontological category of the animal 
impact what we see when we see a dog? In William Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses 
(1942), the narrator evidences the difficulty in not only representing but 
understanding non-human animals when take into account their dynamic, at times 
violent, behaviors. The narrator finds themselves at a lack for words in the sight 
of Lion, a dog, violently attempting to break free from a trap. A dog the characters 
have caught transforms from a dog to “the animal, whatever it was” (205). When 
we are unable to understand an animal, it becomes the animal, an abstract 
concept.  
While the desire to understand what our dogs think when they hear us 
speak could certainly lead to productive outcomes, should they not also come out 
of benevolent motives? Do we want to know how dogs respond to human 
language because we want our dogs to know how well meaning our baby-talk, 
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scolds, and instructions, are, or because we want to build more mutually 
responsive relationships with our companion animals? The answer to questions 
like this lie, in part, in the way we figure dogs into the landscape of our own lives 
and culture.  
The word “dog” might signify plenty of concepts in our heads. But the 
physical presence of a dog should not be confused with the word. Such mistakes 
lead to a denial of the lived experiences of dogs and replace them with our own 
egos; they lead to dogs being used as money making opportunities, as targets for 
misplaced anger, or tools for war and world making. This thesis focuses on the 
consequences of one setting in which this mistake often takes place: the 
wilderness. When seen through an ideology that mistakes the world as a product 
of either nature or culture, dogs become a signifier for humanity, or culture’s 
connection and separation from nature. As domestic animals, dogs become the 
vessels through which humanity is guided through the natural. This trope is 
frequently seen throughout American wilderness narratives.  
This thesis is also concerned with the ways that narratives in the American 
literary tradition seem to force Native Americans into signifier roles similar to the 
role dogs often play. In the nature/culture binary, the human and artificial often 
are placed within culture, with everything else, namely non-human living 
organisms and the non-artificial, inanimate aspects of landscape, lying on the 
natural side. As one can see from the way these definitions are worded here, the 
natural side of the binary is often defined through negation: not being involved 
with humanity. If we ascribe to this definition, we tread dangerous territory when 
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attempting to define anything that might operate between the binary. Both dogs 
and Native Americans are often constructed as guide figures, standing between 
nature and culture for the purpose of bringing humans, typically privileged, white 
males, closer to the nature side of the binary. This results in both parties having an 
unstable connection to any concrete side of the dualsim; dogs are never depicted 
as humans nor are they ever quite animals, and thus are excluded from the 
subjectivity we ascribe to either category. Native Americans are rarely depicted as 
fully human in the way other characters are and are consequently denied their 
humanity in a way that often results in dire consequences. 
 In addition to this, the closer Native Americans are aligned with nature, 
the greater the potential for both authors and readers to place them lower than 
other humans in a biological hierarchy. Consequently, attempts to privilege such 
characters as intermediary figures results in problematic, reductive representations 
that deny the lived experiences of both canine and Native American characters 
and deprive them of their subjectivity. By juxtaposing dog and Native American 
characters in Jack London’s The Call of the Wild and William Faulkner’s Go 
Down, Moses I examine these reductive representations in an effort to show how 
they might be exposed, avoided, and replaced by more productive methods of 
navigating through naturecultures. 
 The Call of the Wild and Go Down Moses, while being unlikely partners in 
this analysis, meet in multiple ways that make this analysis possible. If we 
understand the Ike McCaslin trilogy to be a story of a character attempting to sort 
through his family’s dark past and the apparent destruction of the wilderness he 
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grew up in, The Call of the Wild depicts an inversion of that narrative. Buck, as 
opposed to Ike, leaves the confines of “culture” and goes into the wild, where he 
inherits the biological traits and attitudes of his more wild ancestors in the setting 
of an increasingly wild Yukon Territory. Additionally, I find that the two main 
dogs of the stories, Buck in The Call of the Wild, and Lion in Go Down, Moses, 
display inverted life paths in the way that Lion comes out of ferality and into the 
domestic whereas Buck begins his story as a completely domesticated animal and 
ends as a feral dog, part of a wolf pack. Through these stories, we are able to see 
two extremes of dog-story telling. Faulkner seems to rely heavily on the 
symbolism of the animal signifier whereas London evidences a bias towards the 
role of the detached scientific observer. Both methods lead towards the denial of 
animal subjectivity.  
These consequences partially find their origin in the impulse to separate 
nature and culture. Without this ideological separation, there might not need to be 
a signifying guide. At the very least, their role might be destabilized to the point 
where they could be seen as physical presences. Towards this end, I will borrow 
the phrase natureculture because it is more indicative of the actual setting in 
which humans construct divisions between nature and culture. The idea of a 
natureculture recognizes the partial connections between what we consider to be 
products of human influence, or culture, and products of non-human influence, 
nature. In naturcultures, we see the impacts of the sociocultural interweaving with 
the ecological. Faulkner’s mythology of the hunt is as much natureculture as 
London’s cult of the wolf and Donna Haraway’s idea of the Kennel.  
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I derive my understanding of natureculture from Haraway’s A Companion 
Species Manifesto (2003). This text explores the ways in which a more accurate 
respect for and understanding of dog-human relationships might allow us to 
construct more healthy, egalitarian, and productive relationships of significant 
otherness. From this perspective, dogs occupy a unique space in human 
understandings because we consistently place them in between nature and culture 
while denying them a space in either; yet we also use them to construct our 
notions of the very spaces we leave them out of. However, because we see them 
as a companion species, we cannot deny their materiality and agency; “they are 
not a projection, nor the realization of an intention, nor the telos of anything. They 
are dogs, a species in obligatory, constitutive, historical, protean relationship with 
human beings” (Haraway, “Companion Species Manifesto”, 12). Because of our 
joint histories, we are evolutionarily bound to dogs in a way that requires us to 
acknowledge and understand their material existence if we also wish to fully 
acknowledge our own. For a broader extension of these ideas, I will call upon 
When Species Meet (2009) as well. Specifically, this text can help us understand 
further our injuriously failed past, present and potential successful future with 
dogs. This text follows strains of curiosity that inquire into how we are obliged to 
our canine companions and what appropriate responses to them might look like.  
Broadening the scope of animal – human relations, Colleen Glenney 
Boggs’s Animalia Americana: Animal Representations and Biopolitical 
Subjectivity (2013) looks into the “cultural and political work of animal 
representations” (3). By tracing lines of bestial and affective love between 
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humans and animals, Boggs “read[s] animals as an immanent other that founds 
and confounds the liberal subject” (5). She examines animal representations in 
multiple genres to show the degree to which animal representations matter when 
figuring subjectivity in writing, whether it be in a mystery story or an 
autobiography. Boggs turns to literary representations because she believes 
animals cannot be represented politically, a method that “suggests the ability to be 
recognized by a subject in the political system and to participate in it” (19). In a 
literary context, however, they can be represented, though the degree to which 
they participate in that representation is still questionable. Yet, “it is on the 
grounds of such representations that the terms of animals’ exclusions become 
legible – that animals achieve representation of their exclusion from 
representation and that here at minimum a critique and at best an alternative to 
this exclusion becomes possible” (20). 
Through Boggs’s notion of affect as integral in ethical representation of 
animals, and Haraway’s canine subject matter, I aim to draw out and critique the 
ways the dogs and Native American characters in Go Down, Moses and The Call 
of the Wild are misrepresented as signifier guides. Typically, guides are 
understood as a role or occupation. A guide dog might help hunters locate game 
in exchange for reward. A human guide might be compensated monetarily for 
safely leading travelers through dangerous terrain. The signifier guide, in contrast, 
works like a map in human or canine skin. It is deprived of its subjectivity and 
treated as a conduit through which other characters transcend their cultural 
boundaries and enter the natural. The signified, in this case, is the way to 
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transcend culture: the wilderness. The misrepresentation of guide characters as 
object signifiers leads to real consequences, like the deaths of Lion, Sam, and the 
Yeehats. By understanding these improper representations and their 
consequences, I aim to construct better models of representing characters within 
naturecultures, especially dog characters, that enable us to more productively 
engage with our companion species. 
 To this end, my first chapter will review the literature concerning both 
texts. There is virtually no analysis done comparing the two simultaneously. 
Consequently, the scholarly conversations about each will be dealt with 
separately. Concerning Go Down, Moses, most sources discuss the animals as 
they pertain to the symbolic world Faulkner creates. Conversely, critics of 
London hone in on his attempts to objectively represent animals and the harsh 
territory they reside in. I close the review with a discussion of relevant scholarship 
pertaining to animal studies. 
 The second chapter, “Heredity, Hybridity, and Ferality”, focuses on the 
dogs specifically. Both novels pay particular attention to the dogs’ ancestry and 
attempt to tie this in multiple ways to their behaviors and roles in the stories 
setting. By looking further into the ways hybridity plays into Buck’s journey into 
and Lion’s journey out of ferality, I attempt to show how neither author breaches 
what they seem to truly regard as “wild.” Even London, as concrete as he tries to 
be, reverts to the language of myth when narrating Buck’s “retrogression” into the 
wolf pack. Through an analysis of the dog characters of each text, I show how 
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both the characters and the texts themselves fail to adequately represent and 
respond to their companions. 
 The third chapter, “Blood and Biology: Native Americans and the Natural-
Cultural Inheritance of Companion Species”, moves towards pointing out the 
similarities in the language used to describe the canine and Native American 
characters. Rather than proposing an ontological connection between the two, I 
argue that such a connection is an aspect of the text that merits problematizing. 
Again, we see hybridity operating on multiple levels to create object signifiers out 
of material bodies. In forcing Native American characters and dog characters into 
a role of signified guide, the texts display the physical consequences of too 
heavily relying on either scientific explanations or mythical understandings. 
London’s idea of detached scientific observation combines with his notions of 
atavism to display not only an ahistorical Alaskan wilderness, but also a 
needlessly violent narrative. Faulkner’s reliance on the symbolism of blood 
detaches oppressor from blame and leaves corpses with no one to answer for 
them.  
The fourth and final chapter, From “Pack to Kennel: Working Towards a 
Literary ‘Becoming With’”, attempts to look at more productive elements of dog 
stories. While Faulkner and London both problematically represent dogs and 
Native Americans, there are pieces of their novels that display positive 
relationships and responses. I end my analysis of The Call of the Wild and Go 
Down, Moses on these moments. Then, after having detailed where dog stories 
often fail in adequately writing about our companion species, I offer up a few 
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stories that seem to get it right, at least partially. Focusing on the concepts of 
understanding, representation, and response, I call up various other works outside 
of the American literary wilderness narrative that seem to engage more 
appropriately with dog characters. If we are unable to acknowledge our past 
mistakes, we cannot fully inherit our histories and futures with our companion 
species. For this reason, the problematization of dog stories is necessary. 
Following this, we might find ourselves more prepared to meet the gaze of our 
companion species and respond. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
Chapter 1 
The Call of the Wild, Go Down, Moses, and Animal Studies: 
A Review of Literature 
In our current American culture, companion animals have become much 
more common than in the past. However, their increase in number does not 
necessarily positively correlate with their significance. Our understandings, 
feelings, and attachments to our respective companion animals seem to fluctuate 
and change on a different scale that cannot be measured by simply understood 
numerical metrics. Of the accepted companion species, dogs hold a unique place 
in that they fill many distinct and often separate rolls.  
For instance, the support dog you might see in the airport with a vest that 
says, “pet me”, helping busy travelers de-stress might be seen differently than the 
canine unit that you saw as you went through TSA security. When you read these 
words, you might also imagine different looking dogs: different breeds of canines. 
We make connections between a breed and a role; the pointer is given its name as 
a result of the role humans have it serve. Often, here, is the assumption that a 
breed has specific tendencies and temperaments that render it able or unable to 
exhibit certain behaviors. 
Depending on the perspective one holds, such connections might be 
deemed either problematic or logically appropriate. Proponents of both sides, 
however, often see clear moral issues in applying a similar logic to humans. The 
scenario I describe is one in which differences in race or ethnicity is spoken of in 
terms similar to the way we speak of animal breeds. When put in this way, the 
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problem at hand becomes much more clear. Yet, such talk is existent in our 
society today, albeit in potentially more subtle forms. One might say that the 
difference in dog breeds has a scientific foundation, whereas the supposed 
difference in race has no biological component. However, science was, at one 
time, an argument for a hierarchy of races. Through this, we see the potential 
dangers of categorizing living beings’ efficacies in varying roles based on the 
categories we choose to place them into. This notion relies upon the 
acknowledgement of freedom of the living subject, human or non-human, and its 
lived experience.  
Within the tradition of the American wilderness narrative, we find such 
acknowledgments either denied or granted to many living beings, depending on 
what category they fall into. This acknowledgement is not to be confused with 
privileging. Often, animals can be privileged in certain ways, yet denied their 
subjectivity through this exact act. This happens with other marginalized groups 
in literature as well. Specifically, within the narratives of Jack London and 
William Faulkner, we see narratives that simultaneously privilege certain beings 
as symbolic objects and cast them down as living subjects. Often, these subjects 
are animals, specifically dogs.  
1. Animal Studies and the Non-Human Subject 
In order to understand how a specific study of dogs in literature can be 
beneficial, it is first necessary to mention several significant texts that approach 
the topic of animal studies from a broader lens. Cary Wolfe’s collection, 
Zoontologies: The Question of the Animal (2003), offers us a valuable number of 
essays that are placed somewhere at the midpoint of the quickly growing field of 
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animal studies. This collection of essays pushes readers towards rethinking 
subjectivity and how it pertains to both human animals and non-human animals. It 
urges against anthropocentrism in a way that encourages a less dualistic view of 
difference among life forms. It is not enough to privilege the non-human animal 
through writing, nor is it any longer acceptable to merely challenge the idea of 
human superiority. Instead, the human must be decentered in a way that 
acknowledges difference without diminishing subjectivity. These assertions are 
made through multiple essays that examine the question of the animal from 
various lenses including technological perspectives, psychoanalysis, critical race 
theory, and sociology. While productive and important in many ways, current 
movements in animal studies and posthumanist theory consider the ideas within 
Zoontologies to fall-short of appropriately decentering the human perspective. 
Yet, the text still remains relevant as a milestone for keeping track of the progress 
of animal studies. 
Colleen Glenney Boggs’s Animalia Americana: Animal Representations 
and Biopolitical Subjectivity primarily looks into “what is the cultural and 
political work of animal representations” and then examines “what happens when 
we include other species in our understanding of subjectivity” (3). To Boggs, the 
American subject is both constructed and problematized by the way animals have 
been represented and related to humans in the past and present. Specifically, she 
traces the development of human subjectivity as it pertains to human’s sexual and 
affective relationships with animals. Melding both fiction, history, and theory into 
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multiple analyses, Boggs’ work gives us a valuable look into how the field of 
animal studies can be further developed through interdisciplinary approaches. 
Amongst many of the theorists that Boggs calls upon, Donna Haraway 
seems to be the most appropriate for the current review due to her extensive 
theoretical work concerning companion species, dogs in specific. In “A 
Companion Species Manifesto” (2003), Haraway explores the ways in which a 
more accurate respect for and understanding of dog-human relationships might 
allow us to construct more healthy, egalitarian, and productive relationships of 
significant otherness. Significant otherness is brought about by the conjunction of 
disparate subjects and their respective cultures that is accountable to both the 
separate pasts and tethered futures of each party involved. From this perspective, 
dogs occupy a unique space in the human perspective because we consistently 
place them in between nature and culture while denying them a space in either, 
yet use them to construct our notions of the very spaces we leave them out of. 
However, because of we see them as a companion species, we cannot deny their 
materiality and agency; “they are not a projection, nor the realization of an 
intention, nor the telos of anything. They are dogs, a species in obligatory, 
constitutive, historical, protean relationship with human beings” (12). Haraway’s 
manifesto presents the unsavory parts of humanities history with dogs and calls us 
to own and acknowledge them. From here, we might better be able to understand 
the ways in which species that are culturally linked, though categorically 
disparate, might exist together in a way that rejects a network of domination and 
embraces more positive “multi-species futures” (64). 
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2: London’s Canine Protagonists 
 Drawing primarily from Jack London, Michael Lundblad’s “From Animal 
to Animality Studies” (2009) rethinks how we go about studying animals in 
literature and artifacts of culture to offer a more effective language with which we 
can accurately discuss the relationships between animals and humans. Animal 
studies, Lunblad asserts, in its efforts to promote animal advocacy through 
explorations of animal representations, “runs the risk of ahistorical, universalist 
prescriptions about how to treat or interact with non-human animals” (500). 
Conversely, his idea of animality studies investigates the ways in which 
animality, its expressions, and manifestations have been understood, affected, and 
appropriated by humans. While even this method runs the risk of speciesism, 
Lunblad believes it can open up animal studies to new opportunities, such as an 
understanding of “alternative constructions of love between human and 
nonhuman beings that resist the singular and reductive signifier of ‘bestiality’” 
(500). For instance, multiple scholars in the past have interpreted descriptions of 
emotions between Buck and John Thornton to be purely bestial. However, if one 
considers the psychoanalytic work done during the time of London’s writing and 
combines that with studies of wolf sexualities, one might see how these moments 
in The Call of the Wild could also reflect an appropriation of animality that draws 
out a new definition of male homosexuality.  
While Lunblad looks at ways that an animality study of London might 
allow us to break out of reductive bestial readings, Christine Mahady inquires into 
the degree to which animal studies might help us see London’s dogs as signifying 
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something other than human regression and racial atavism. “Teaching Old 
Readers New Tricks: Jack London’s Interspecies Ethics” (2012) argues that 
London’s canine perspectives allow readers to recognize and embrace 
corporeality as an aspect that is shared by all animals, though often rejected by 
human animals to their detriment. Through the unlikely comparison between 
White Fang and Martin Eden, Mahady locates within London’s stories an 
assertion that human’s corporeality can be better understood, accepted, and used 
through an animal-centered approach to surrounding. This acceptance is tied to an 
ethics of responsibility toward surrounding subjects and objects. With this ethics 
in mind, we are able to read an animal embodiment in London’s work that 
escapes past deterministic readings.  
Heavily influencing the work of both Mahady and Lunblad, Jonathan 
Auerbach uses multiple approaches, including animal studies and queer theory, in 
order to make statements about London’s own biography and early 20th century 
America that he occupied. Both Male Call: Becoming Jack London (1996) and 
“‘Congested Mails’: Buck and Jack’s ‘Call’” (1995) inquire into the ways 
London’s wilderness narratives have as much to do with culture as they do nature. 
While the central thesis of Male Call revolves around London the author, 
Auerbach manages to maintain an appropriate reverence to the integrity of 
London’s characters as being both separate and connected to the author. By 
examining London and his works as simultaneously separate and equal, Auerbach 
is able to come to conclusions that contribute significantly to our interpretations 
on both London and his body of work. 
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3: Faulkner’s Natureculture and Its Symbolic Objects 
 While William Faulkner might be located in a literary tradition different 
from that of London, his work concerning the southern wilderness is similarly 
entrenched within the struggle to differentiate between definitions of nature and 
culture. In addition to this, Faulkner’s dogs occupy similarly ambiguous spaces 
within that binary. However, Faulkner’s work finds itself concerned with many 
other tensions such as binaries concerning race and the American South’s cultural 
and social climate. Consequently, Faulkner’s dogs and other non-human animals 
can seem to be less of a central theme and surface less in his texts than those of 
London’s. For this reason, amongst many others, we do not have such a wide 
reaching foundation of scholarship dealing primarily with animal representations 
in Faulkner. In addition to this, a majority of what we do have deals more with the 
symbolic significance of these non-human animals. 
 For instance, Gerard Hoffman’s “Myth, Ideology, Symbol and Faulkner’s 
Modernism/Postmodernism in Go Down, Moses” (1997) looks into how 
Faulkner’s constructed myth in “The Bear” depicts a nature/culture binary where 
the dividing line is not necessarily clear. The model proposed in this myth 
combines various incongruent ideologies that are drawn out through symbols. The 
mythical space, in this case, is the hunt. The text seems to create a space that is 
not only occupied by the binary of hunter and hunted, but also by the reversal of 
privilege in this binary. The hunter is supposed to triumph over the hunted - the 
hunters are supposed to kill Old Ben as skillfully as possible -yet is also supposed 
to be in communion with the natural and the animal. The hunted “passively 
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waiting the hunter to be the essence of the mythical spirit” (Hoffman 667); to be 
worthy of spilling worthy blood. Though this text discusses animals at length, its 
interpretations are limited to the symbolic. Consequently, its benefit towards 
animal studies concerning Faulkner lies primarily in giving us a symbolic 
understanding of the animals in Go Down, Moses that we can shore up against our 
own interpretations of animal embodiment.  
 Instead of focusing on the symbolic, Jay S. Winston, in “Going Native in 
Yoknapatawpha: Faulkner’s Fragmented America and ‘the Indian’” (2002), sees 
the hunt narrative as Faulkner’s attempt at working out a way to “overcome the 
legacy of dispossession” that white Americans have created. Faulkner attempts to 
point out, and then develop, the ways in which “the white man” has wronged the 
nation and its non-white inhabitants. According to Winston, in order to gain a 
truer connection with the land, the inhabitants must gain a better connection to its 
native inhabitants, or, “the Indian.” Faulkner’s method of transcending the 
“legacy of dispossession” involves transforming the perception of natives from 
“antagonist to ancestor.” This transformation takes the form of the character of 
Sam Fathers. By making Fathers half black, Faulkner makes the connection 
between the white man’s treatment of both black people and Native Americans. 
According to Winston, Faulkner is keenly aware of the mythical Indian being 
separate from natives themselves. Consequently, Winston’s interpretation rejects 
any readings that emphasize the symbolism within Fathers. Instead, he sees 
Faulkner attempting to make a literal familial connection between Fathers and 
Ike. Ike fills the space left by Father’s childlessness. In this, the text attempts to 
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establish Fathers as a claimable ancestor of Ike, therefore moving Fathers and the 
idea of the native away from antagonistic connections.  
 Also highlighting difference, hierarchy, and inequality, Michael 
Wainwright discusses how we see inequality functioning between humans, 
animals, and the environment in “The Bear”. “Ecological Issues: Rousseau’s ‘A 
Stag Hunt’ and Faulkner’s ‘A Bear Hunt’” connects the inequality we see in 
Faulkner’s reworking of “The Bear” for Big Woods to Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 
“A Stag Hunt”. This theme, Wainwright claims, comes from Rousseau’s theory 
that man was once primitive and in “a pure state of nature” (Wainwright 293) then 
evolved into the “savage (or natural) man whose reasoning abilities set him apart 
from other animals” (Wainwright 293). Rousseau believed that the transition time 
between these two human states must have been a time of equality, since human’s 
ability to reason has long been the source of many violent acts towards those seen 
as lacking this capability. Faulkner’s narrative seems to exist in part somewhere 
in this intermediary period. Consequently, we are able to establish a basis for 
examples of both equality and the lack of it within the text.  
 Matt Low also draws on “A Bear Hunt” from Big Woods  and contrasts it 
with “The Bear” in Go Down, Moses in “‘The Bear’ in Go Down, Moses and “Big 
Woods: Faulkner’s (Re)visions for a deeper Ecology” (2009). At odds with 
arguments that view Go Down, Moses as an environmental piece, Low argues that 
the revisions that Faulkner made to “The Bear,” that he later put in “Big Woods,” 
could possibly make the chapter one of modernism’s most “environmental” texts. 
Most consider “The Bear” and much of Faulkner’s other works as not being 
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specifically “environmental” because they deal with the environment as a thing of 
secondary concern, with humans being primary. Lowe mentions that it is part 4 
that makes most critics see “The Bear” as falling in line with the primary concern 
of the rest of the book - race, incest, and miscegenation - instead of aligning itself 
with an ecological focus. Most scholars, Lowe claims, see “The Bear” as a prime 
example of how nature, in opposition with culture, is paradoxical because it gains 
its privilege through culture itself. Lowe, instead of situating “The Bear” within 
Go Down Moses, situates it in Big Woods, eradicating the dichotomy, of nature 
vs. culture. In Big Woods, Faulkner eliminates part 4, which, in Lowe’s argument, 
makes it purely a story about the hunt, and not about race. 
 Christina M. Colvin also finds issues with interpretations of Faulkner’s 
nature and culture that do not recognize its problematic assumptions. “‘His Guts 
Are All out of Him’: Faulkner’s Eruptive Animals” (2014) resists the tendency to 
offer reductive readings of Faulkner’s animals that limit them as symbols, or foils, 
of mechanisms for bringing out details of the human Characters. Colvin claims 
that these readings rely upon and support the human animal binary that Faulkner’s 
work seems to deconstruct. To Colvin, these animals are embodied through their 
experiences. They live through the same mechanisms that humans live. In spite of 
this, humans are able to treat animals violently. Faulkner’s work, then, 
“underscores how the social construction of animals, and particularly the 
language used to marginalize and thereby harm animals, eludes their diverse, 
material lives. Colvin argues that, through culturally constructed rules, 
definitions, and perceptions, the hunters have bound Old Ben in their own human, 
 21 
civilized reality. This contradicts, then, their own view of the wilderness. Thus, in 
creating these codes, the hunters have done to the wilderness exactly what they 
say they are not doing through the acknowledgement of their own code. Colvin 
argues this irony to be an intentional facet of the text that serves to point out the 
wrongs done to animals by imposing human culture, or even ideas of ‘the natural’ 
upon them.  
 As we can see, the animals and environments discussed in the literature of 
Faulkner and London have merited a large amount of criticism from many 
different fields. Both bodies of work incorporate issues of race and animality, 
Faulkner relying more on the former, London on the latter. However, Faulkner’s 
dogs share much in common with those of London. In addition to this, both 
authors’ native characters seem to occupy a liminal space between the nature and 
culture constructed by each author. By inquiring further into these liminal spaces, 
and the binaries constructed around them, we might better understand the faults 
that result as consequences of these constructions. A comparative look at Faulkner 
and London might also help us in better understanding this issues and how they 
became part of American Literary history. 
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Chapter 2 
Heredity, Hybridity, and Ferality 
At the end of Jack London’s “To Build a Fire” (1902), we see the dog 
character seeking “the other food-providers and fire-providers” (London 639). 
After the majority of the text suggests the human has been using the dog as a tool, 
we see that the dog, having survived its companion, was also using the man. This 
mutual using, suggesting mutual objectification, complicates our view of the dog 
and man as companions. While we see the relationship both building and breaking 
companionship bonds, from the way the two take turns following each other to the 
instant the man attempts to kill the dog for its warmth, we must acknowledge that 
this is one representation of the co-evolution of dogs and humans, with all of its 
“brutalities as well as multiform beauties” (Haraway, “The Companion Species 
Manifesto”, 119) included. We see these beauties and brutalities manifesting 
throughout The Call of the Wild and Go Down, Moses as well. From the 
relationships of John Thornton and Buck and Lion and Boon to the training the 
two dogs undergo, we witness the effects of dog-human co-evolution.  
In all three of these stories, we see the stakes of taking advantage of these 
companions and our co-evolved status: “the relation between what counts as 
nature and what counts as culture in Western discourse and its cousins, and the 
correlated issue of who and what counts as an actor” (Haraway, “The Companion 
Species Manifesto”, 118). In London’s stories, the dog characters muddle what 
counts as nature and culture. They also resist clear definitions of subject and 
object. Like the dog in “To Build a Fire”, they are often used as invented or “self-
birthed” tools “whereby man makes himself repetitively” (Haraway, “The 
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Companion Species Manifesto”, 119). The dog becomes the man’s tool for 
navigating through the frozen river. Yet, they also display how such 
objectifications deconstruct themselves when they are inverted by the image of 
“the cringing scavenger mirrored in mere village dogs” (Haraway, “The 
Companion Species Manifesto”, 117). The dog uses the man for warmth and then 
searches for other humans once warmth will not be provided by his current 
companion. This is a world of separation and objectification, a relationship void 
of affect. 
Conversely, The Call of the Wild suggests a world in which dogs and 
humans acknowledge each other as partially connected parts to a whole. Those 
who do not, such as Hal and Charles, are doomed to the same fate as the man in 
“To Build a Fire”. The boundaries still exist, but they are crossable. “Flexibility 
and opportunism are the name of the game” (Haraway, “The Companion Species 
Manifesto”, 121) in London’s Alaskan wilderness.  
Similarly, the woods of Go Down, Moses set up boundaries between 
nature and culture, human and animal, that are both concrete and permeable. The 
relationships are dependent on one another. The culture of the hunt cannot exist 
without the nature in which it is set in. To a degree, nature, at least the natural 
setting in which they hunt, is upheld and preserved by the tradition carried on by 
Ike and his peers. We see the stakes of this inter-dependence later on, in “Delta 
Autumn”, as the disappearance of the wilderness is tied to Roth and his lack of 
respect for the culture of the hunt.  
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One method of productively reading these boundaries and their 
permeability is dependent on acknowledging significant otherness and co-
evolution between companion species. While this chapter deals primarily with the 
dogs of the two main texts I am analyzing, it is necessary to acknowledge these 
principles and the human component to dog-human relationships in order 
adequately analyze the dogs as they appear in each text. The concept of heredity 
cannot be figured outside of relatings, which are only tracked by those able to 
keep records, those embedded within a culture of histories. Hybridity can only be 
figured in terms of heredity and co-evolution. Ferality requires a culture to “fall 
from” and a nature to “fall into”. These three categories, heredity, hybridity, and 
ferality, and their components meet in the characters of Buck and Lion. 
The foundation of these categories leads to multiple areas, heredity being 
the closest to the origin. Heredity is, at times, one of the main mechanisms 
through which we figure identity and classification, especially concerning 
animals. For dogs, their heredity can be considered in terms of breed. By naming 
a dog breed, one signifies purposes, images, representations, and mannerisms 
simultaneously. This utilitarian method of naming has productive possibilities, but 
can also lead to serious consequences.  
In The Call of the Wild, breed figures in heavily when attaching names and 
categories to who lives and dies. However, in the beginning of the text, on the 
judge’s farm, breed is merely a familial and visual identifier. When we are given 
Buck’s familial ancestry, we are given more than just his breed: 
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 His father, Elmo, a huge St. Bernard, had been the Judge’s inseparable 
companion, and Buck bid fair to follow in the way of his father. He was 
not so large - he weighed only one hundred and forty pounds - for his 
mother, Shep, had been a Scotch Shepherd dog. Nevertheless, one hundred 
and forty pounds, to which was added the dignity that comes of good 
living and universal respect, enabled him to carry himself in a right royal 
fashion. (London 16) 
The text attaches significance not only to his breed but the situation he was 
brought up in, presenting the two as nearly mutually exclusive. It also suggests 
some sort of familial model, using words like “father” and “mother” and giving 
all of them names. As the son of the judges closest companion, he inherits this 
relationship to the judge. With this inheritance, Buck gains a lofty space in the 
hierarchy of animals on the farm. Buck is “royal” and the “inseparable 
companion” of the judge. Yet, he does not inherit his father’s size. One hundred 
and forty pounds sounds heavy for a dog, until one considers that the typical 
weight for a St. Bernard is at minimum one hundred and forty pounds. So, we also 
receive a contextualizing: he is small, for his breed. We also are given his 
potentiality; with his ancestry, the reader attaches whatever they assume St. 
Bernards and Scotch Collies to be capable of.  
 Lion, on the other hand, is depicted as much less privileged than Buck. He 
is not introduced as the protagonist of the story nor is he able to “carry himself in 
a right royal fashion”. He first is mentioned as someone to be “hated and feared” 
(Faulkner 198), rather than as a companion. The reader first meets him through 
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the logs of a trap, “a heavy body crashing with tremendous force against the door” 
(Faulkner 205). He is just “the animal, whatever it was” (Faulkner 205). However, 
as he calms down in the enclosure and loses his wildness, the men begin to  
“see it now- part mastiff, something of Airedale and something of a dozen other 
strains probably, better than thirty inches at the shoulders and weighing as they 
guessed almost ninety pounds, with cold yellow eyes and a tremendous chest and 
over all that strange color like a blued gun-barrel” (Faulkner 206). Unlike Buck, 
Lion’s ancestry cannot be traced to any specific mother or father figure. For Buck, 
his breed tells us what he looks like; it determines his appearance. In contrast, 
Lion’s breed is determined by his appearance. His “blued gun-barrel” color 
suggests to the other characters that he is part Airedale. His size and shape tell 
them he may be some part mastiff. In either case, we see the assumption making 
process inverted. Lion, coming out of the wild, has his breed determined by his 
appearance. Buck, going into the wild, is described through his breed. In relation 
to the description itself, we also see Lion fitting into Faulkner’s hunt myth as a 
creature of “tremendous” proportions. His mysterious heredity, having potentially 
a dozen other noticeable “strains”, aid in this legendary construction as well.   
 This is the way that Lion and the other animals have consistently been 
interpreted: as symbols that fit into the mythic hunt that Faulkner constructs. 
However, Christina M Colvin, in “His Guts Are All out of Him: Faulkner’s 
Eruptive Animals” (2014), argues us out of this problematization of Go Down, 
Moses and into a reading that places the blame of this skewed interpretation onto 
the hunters themselves. In this reading, Faulkner is actually attempting to reveal 
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the circuitous, marginalizing voices of outdoorsmen. Lion fits into this 
interpretation by “[challenging the men’s] attempt to turn him into another 
symbolic animal: that is, from his first intrusion into the narrative amid a trail of 
gore, Lion’s brute, embodied reality resists conceptual appropriation” (102). 
Because Lion’s actions, the killing of the colt, are the first to demystify Old Ben 
and his being the dog that will finally end the myth of Old Ben, he cannot actually 
fit into their construction because he is destroying it. Consequently, Ike should 
hate and fear Lion not only because he will bring an end to Old Ben, but also 
“because he condemns to failure Ike’s romanticization of Old Ben and the Big 
Woods” (102). 
It is interesting to note, here, that the breeds of both Buck and Lion are 
explicitly stated and discussed in “The Companion Species Manifesto”. While 
Haraway’s section on breed discusses primarily Great Pyrenees dogs and 
Australian Shepherds, her larger story that those two fit into is “of two divergent 
kinds of dogs – livestock guardian dogs (LGDs) and herders” (“The Companion 
Species Manifesto”, 155). Buck is a hybrid between these two divergent dogs, 
being both an LGD as a St. Bernard and a herder as a Scotch Shepherd. In this 
light, Buck’s own heredity gains much more significance as he becomes a hybrid 
of dogs bred for almost opposite purposes for the same natureculture of tending to 
livestock. Haraway also spends time discussing “dogs of no fixed breed or kind” 
(“The Companion Species Manifesto”,156), a category that Lion fits into quite 
nicely. In Lion’s case, he might be likened to the “Puerto Rican strays called 
Satos [that] become members of Massachusetts ‘forever families’ out of histories 
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of stunning complexity and consequence” (188-189). We might figure in Sam and 
the hunters as the Massachusetts ‘forever families’ that adopt Lion into their home 
of the hunt. 
Lion is not the deer that Sam hails as chief, nor is he the host of the forest. 
However, he is regarded with much more respect than the other dogs by all of the 
hunters and the narrator. He is portrayed as an elusive mystery. Lion is neither 
god nor mortal; Lion is depicted as a demi-deity, marked by hybridity that enables 
him to be many things and fill many roles at once. As Sam tells us, his lack of 
barking, his silence, is a result of “that blue dog in him” (212), the Airedale in 
him. If we agree with the regular assumptions of breed temperaments concerning 
mastiffs and Airedales as well, he fits the exact type of dog they seem to need for 
their task. The mastiff grants him the size he will need to take on Old Ben. In 
addition to this, the trainability of the mastiff makes it easier for Sam to train him. 
He is both defensive guardian and offensive hunter. This deified representation 
attempts to privilege Lion and, to a certain degree, is effective in doing so. 
However, this privileging seems to fit only within the mythic space the text 
constructs. Consequently, this representation seems lacking in regard to Lion’s 
own embodied experience.  
In contrast, Buck’s hybridity and its effects are most often described in 
material detail, without reference to his breed. A contrast between the two might 
allow us to better envision how Lion’s legendary, symbolic depiction both raises 
him up but diminishes his status as a living subject. In Buck’s case, his status in 
the sled team is not determined by what type of dog he is. For instance, when 
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Perrault first sees Buck, he quickly estimates the dog’s value, without reference to 
his breed, saying “Sacredam . . . . Dat one dam bully dog! Eh? How moch” (28). 
Perrault estimates Buck’s worth to the team, finding it easy to give up $300 of 
government money on the dog. While the text suggests this is a high price, it also 
tells us that “Perrault knew dogs, and when he looked at Buck he knew that he 
was one in a thousand” (29). In this instance, we see a value judgment being 
placed on Buck based off of currency, not his breed. Due to the lack of any 
reference to Buck’s breed by Perrault, we might assume that Perrault’s judgment 
has more to do with Buck’s appearance of suitability for the job, rather than what 
type of dogs his mother and father were. This stresses the Buck’s individualism 
without focusing on some sort of unrealistic exceptionalism. While the positive 
traits that Perrault sees in Buck might well be a result of his breed, the man 
chooses to attribute them to Buck as an individual. 
However, we do see his hybrid status coming into play even in the absence 
of direct references. After Buck is tasked with hauling the sled for the first time, 
François exclaims, “dat Buck, heem pool lak hell. I tich Heem Quek as anyt’ing” 
(32). Buck’s size, deriving from his St. Bernard half, allows him to move through 
the snow with enough force to pull the sled hard enough to impress François. 
Earlier on, the narrator also tells us that Buck “learned easily” and was “wise” 
(32). While the reference to Buck’s strength can be more easily connected to his 
St. Bernard ancestry, the second half of François’ statement might be read as a 
reference to the intelligence one might assume he gained from his Scotch 
shepherd mother. Because Buck’s strength and intelligence are so often 
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referenced in unison, the reader can assume that the text has moved away from 
naming his exact breed and instead chooses to mention qualities of those breeds. 
The text also avoids explicitly connecting Buck’s negative traits to his breed. 
After his first few days of hauling the sled, we discover that “Buck’s feet were not 
so compact and hard as the feet of the huskies. His had softened during the many 
generations since the day his last wild ancestor was tamed” (43). At first, we have 
Buck, the individual, compared to the generalized “huskies”. Buck’s feet are 
different, less suited for long snow travel, than husky feet. However, we have an 
indirect reference to Buck’s breed through his “last wild ancestor”. Through these 
references we see the narrator trying to navigate between Buck’s individuality and 
ancestry.  
In addition to this, we see Buck’s hybridity manifesting beyond his breed 
and roles and into his potential to traverse across a divide between nature and 
culture. His body quickly diverges from his tame ancestors’ fragile footpads as 
“his feet grew hard to the trail” (44). As Buck is “suddenly jerked from the heart 
of civilization and flung into the heart of things primordial” (30), we see him 
quickly regress into a state of semi-ferality. The narrator tells us “his development 
(or retrogression) was rapid” (38). This retrogression is specifically referred to as 
“his decivilization” (37). Buck begins in Judge Miller’s civilized domain, 
amongst primarily humans but also dogs that “did not count” (22). While his full 
“retrogression” ends with his induction into the wolf pack, his decvilization is 
complete long before this. While he is still with Perrault and François, his 
decivilization is “evidenced by his ability to flee from the defence of a moral 
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consideration and so save his hide” (37). The narrator connects the wilderness to a 
collapse of morals to make space for self-survival skills. The concept of survival, 
however, is convoluted at best, seeing as the dogs do not just flee or fight in order 
to survive. At times, they fight even if their lives are not in danger. This is best 
seen through the rivalry between Spitz and Buck. This tension seems to be 
derived from pride or a result of Spitz wariness of Buck’s strength and Buck’s 
envy of Spitz’s position. However, the narrator seems to suggest that the existence 
of Buck and Spitz together within the team is a hindrance to the team’s success, 
the team’s survival. Here, we see a wolf pack oriented hierarchy, where there can 
only be one “dominant primordial beast” (51). This is further evidenced when 
neither François nor Perrault mourns the loss of Spitz. Their reaction to his 
disappearance is purely utilitarian, knowing that one of the two eventually had to 
go; “No more Spitz, no more trouble” (52). To them, it is a matter of efficiency. 
To Buck, he has become “the dominant primordial beast who had made his kill 
and found it good” (51). Buck, through killing Spitz and establishing his own 
dominance, has claimed his own subjectivity. 
Part of the significance within this portion of the text lies in the 
assumption that only the dominant member of the team can have subjectivity. 
Only Buck can find his kill as “good”. This is problematic in multiple ways, 
especially considering that the other dogs are not nearly as verbally privileged as 
Buck, even though they still clearly make their own decisions. In addition to this, 
we never see Buck as a full, autonomous subject. After he answers the call and 
joins the wolf pack, he loses his name. The narrator tells us that, after he begins to 
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run with the wolves, “here may well end the story of Buck” (100). He disappears 
into the wild, only to be seen in “splashes of brown on head and muzzle, and with 
a rift of white centering down the chest” (100) on the later born timber wolves. 
His full transition from Judge Miller’s culture to the wolves’ nature, his passage 
from domesticity to ferality, ends in him becoming the “Ghost Dog” (100).  
In Go Down, Moses, we also are never given a representation of Lion in 
the wild as a fully autonomous being. Instead, we first see him in his first step into 
the cultured environment of the hunt. Similar to Buck’s representation after he 
answers “the call”, we only receive fragmented traces of Lions feral existence. 
Upon finding the tracks near the colt that Lion kills, “General Compson said, 
‘Good God, what a wolf” (203). General Compson notes the size of Lion and his 
ferocity, likening him to a wolf, similar to the way that Buck is described upon his 
first meeting with Perrault. He even poses a conundrum to the other dogs in that 
they cannot pick up or identify his scent. This leads Walter Ewell to suggest that 
this wolf might have been a ghost, or “a hant” (204). Then, Sam catches Lion, 
pulling him out of his ferality. From the moment the men see Lion, they begin to 
figure him in the language of tools and weapons; “They saw an animal almost the 
color of a gun or pistol barrel” (205). Yet, they cannot fully realize this use of 
Lion the way he is. Consequently, they must induct him into their culture of the 
hunt, their natureculture, through some form of training. Sam, who undertakes 
Lion’s training, makes this clear; he wants Lion trained, not tamed, only to the 
degree that he understands “the only way he can get out of that crib and stay out 
of it is to do what Sam or somebody tells him to do” (208). Consequently, we can 
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understand this to suggest that Sam and the others want the benefits of his feral 
status, his bravery and independence, while still keeping control of him, keeping 
him in their game. In this way, he fits into a similar space that Buck exists in 
while he is a part of the dog team.  
 Detailing the process of both Lion and Buck’s training gives us an 
important glimpse into the ways they are brought into and fit in their respective 
naturecultures; their training can be considered an act of enculturation. Drawing 
from Haraway, I would like to propose ideal versions of dog training based off of 
“intersubjectivity and mutuality” (“The Companion Species Manifesto”,133). It is 
important to note here that “intersubjectivity does not mean “equality” . . . but it 
does mean paying attention to the conjoined dance of face-to-face significant 
otherness” (133). An ideal of intersubjectivity takes into account potential 
constructed hierarchies, modes of relating, and the potentialities of subjects while 
still acknowledging the immanent value of others and how the former three play a 
role in both supporting and jeopardizing those subjects. Haraway proposes 
multiple ways we might look at dog training, each of which are both effective yet 
imperfect. However, these methods attempt to mitigate the consequences of 
training dogs to serve a certain purpose through sustained efforts to meet the 
dog’s needs. At times, such as in Susan Garrett’s Ruff Love, the dog’s training 
revolves around control and reward, or “click and treat” (“The Companion 
Species Manifesto”, 135) principles. In contrast, Vicki Hearne’s training methods 
rely on punishment and correction. However, Haraway finds a link between the 
two: communication and relational respect (“The Companion Species Manifesto”, 
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139-140). Consequently, this section will offer a close reading of the different 
ways in which Buck and Lion are trained and the degree to which communication 
and respect, response and “companion species relating under the sign of 
significant otherness” (140) are found present or lacking.  
 Lion’s training happens rather abruptly, seeing as the moment he is 
captured it begins. Major de Spain makes the mistake of understanding training as 
synonymous with taming. However, Sam has a much different idea. His method 
of training has nothing to do with taming Lion, but everything to do with training 
him to understand that Sam is his provider, his master. Aside from understanding 
and respecting this, Lion is free to do as he pleases. Sam says “I don’t want him 
tame . . . . But I almost rather he be tame than scared, of me or any man or any 
thing. But he wont be neither, of nothing” (205-206). From summer to mid-
winter, Sam continues this process of training Lion, starving him then feeding him 
and repeating that process over and over again. In this way, we see Sam enacting 
harsh discipline, hitting Lion when he snaps at Sam for attempting to touch him. 
We only see this process once over, however. The next time Lion appears, he is 
trained and at Sam’s side. The two seem to communicate, at least to the degree 
that Lion eventually understands Sam’s message. Additionally, the two seem to 
gain some amount of mutual respect for one another. Sam understands he has no 
chance of touching Lion without receiving some sort of injury unless Lion is 
weakened by starvation. Likewise, Lion eventually understands that Sam has 
become his food provider, and without granting him the respect that is due that 
role, he will continue on in the pattern of periodical starvation. While we see both 
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communication and respect in this situation, there is neither a high degree of 
mutual respect nor any sort of effort to meet the dog’s needs. Additionally, the 
text gives no mention of how detrimental this process is to Lion, aside from 
describing the degree to which he is at the mercy of Sam and under his control. 
The process is never described as the negative, painful process it most likely is for 
Lion. However, Sam does succeed in bringing Lion under his control while still 
keeping him “like he is” (208), and throughout the text we rarely see any human 
character give Lion any sort of actual command. He is allowed to do as he 
pleases, so long as he stays in the Big Bottom with the hunters and aids in the 
hunt for Old Ben. Much is sacrificed and gained, but it is difficult to say if Sam 
and the others are engaging in adequate response to their companion.  
 Buck’s training process, however, differs significantly. First, Buck is 
trained by both humans and dogs. Second, Buck’s training is described actively 
through him learning as a capable subject, instead of a passive process described 
through what is done to him. Third, Buck has much more freedom to act during 
his training, considering he is not in a cage the whole time. The methods used to 
train Buck are very diverse because he must first be broken, like Lion; then he 
must learn to pull the sled correctly; and lastly must learn how to properly interact 
with the dogs on the team. Furthermore, Buck has multiple companions 
throughout the story and therefore we have many different instances in which we 
can analyze the methods of response displayed. However, I will focus on Buck’s 
initial training, his induction into “the law of club and fang (30). This law 
represents Buck’s only formal training, if it can be called formal.  
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 It begins with “the man in the red sweater” (26) and his club. After 
repeatedly attempting to attack the man and repeatedly being beaten back by the 
club, Buck is told by the man “we’ve had our little ruction, and the best thing we 
can do is to let it go at that. You’ve learned your place, and I know mine. Be a 
good dog and all’ll go well and the goose hang high. Be a bad dog, and I’ll whale 
the stuffin’ outa you. Understand” (28). In this, the text exhibits key component of 
effective communication. Through giving Buck the opportunity to attack and 
follow his own will, the man has given Buck a chance to respond and has 
acknowledged him as a subject. By defending himself in response to the attack, 
the man has respected Buck’s power while also commanding respect for himself. 
While Buck does not understand the words like the reader, it is clear he 
understands the man’s meaning; “he was beaten (he knew that); but he was not 
broken. He saw, once for all, that he stood no chance against a man with a club” 
(28). Through the struggle between the two, we see them in “the conjoined dance 
of face-to-face significant otherness” (Haraway, “The Companion Species 
Manifesto”, 133). They are not equals, but they are two subjects acknowledging 
each other in communication and respect. Additionally, we must take notice that it 
is not the man’s power with the club that is stressed here; it is the club itself. “The 
club was a revelation. It was [Buck’s] introduction to the reign of primitive law” 
(28). Had Buck not acknowledged this law, he would have been killed, either by 
the man in the red sweater or some one who came along later. In this scene, we 
see the enculturation process of Buck involving successful communication, 
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mutual respect, and at least a partial consideration for Buck’s own needs and well-
being.  
 However, this scene only shows us the law of the club, only half of the 
“primitive law” London sets up in his narrative. The other half is introduced and 
administered by the dogs: the law of the fang. The dogs in this story are much less 
forgiving than the humans. The first example the reader crosses involves the death 
of Curly. Without so much as a warning, Curly is brutally attacked by another dog 
for getting too close. Once she is down, the other dogs pounce on her, tearing her 
to pieces. From this, Buck understands that in this culture, one must be careful 
who one approaches and how, because there is “no fair play. Once down, that was 
the end of you” (31). This is not taught so much as it is learned, seeing as Curly 
never had the chance to learn from her mistake. The law of the fang is not always 
explicitly communicated with timeliness.  
 The second instance involves the dogs and François working together to 
teach Buck how to be an effective member of the sled team. Dave and Spitz both 
do their best to make sure Buck learns his job quickly, “nipp[ing] Buck’s hind 
quarters whenever he was in error” and growl[ing] sharp reproof . . . or . . . 
jerk[ing] Buck into the way he should go” (32). The dogs administer immediate, 
often violent instruction to ensure that Buck makes no mistake of his duties. Their 
method of communication is utilitarian and swift. While they are harsh teachers, 
Dave is also “fair and very wise. He never nipped Buck without cause, and he 
never failed to nip him when he stood in need of it” (35). So, the reader sees that 
there is some amount of consistency in order to remain fair. All the while, 
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François directs the team as a whole and trusts the dogs to make sure Buck learns 
how to obey the commands. Here, we see mutual respect and communication 
occurring between the three experienced members, allowing Buck to be trained 
effectively “under the combined tuition of his two mates and François” (32). The 
three communicate to Buck in a way that he is easily able to understand and 
respond to. Consequently, we see the effective modes of training operating here 
through socialization and learned behavior. The dogs offer him examples and 
François gives Buck cues to connect to those behaviors. We also see the hierarchy 
that has been constructed, with Buck in between his “commrades”, putting him in 
a position to be effectively commanded by the two of them. François takes the 
position of team leader, rather than master commander. Obedience, 
communication, and response are key in this situation. 
 When not in the harness, the dogs have a similar way of communicating 
and associating with one another. Buck’s enculturation process here involves 
similar nips, bites, and jerks. When he meets Sol-leks, he has an experience 
similar to Curly, though much more forgiving. After a slash “to the bone for three 
inches up and down” (33), Buck learns that Sol-leks dislikes being approached on 
his blind side. Billee communicates less violently, through whines, squirms and 
wriggles, he “show[s] his good will and intentions” and helps Buck learn how 
best to sleep while on the trail. So, we can assume that each of the dogs have 
different communication styles depending on their personality. Furthermore, the 
dogs give him a practical lesson involving food; if he ate as fast as his mates, he 
would not get any food stolen. He was not taught this, but understood it after “he 
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watched and learned” (37). These lessons are vital and the dogs have neither the 
time and energy nor the full capabilities to teach Buck these lessons in any other 
way. They assume that if he does not have the ability to adapt, he will not be fit to 
survive in this environment anyway. Buck must learn all he can in order to avoid 
a “swift and terrible death” (37). This is the law, the culture, that the other dogs 
bring Buck into. 
Lion, on the other hand, refuses to adopt the culture of the other dogs 
insofar as he hardly associates with them. He only partakes in the culture of the 
hunt insofar as the humans require him to. He has more agency than the other 
dogs in the narrative. For instance, when Sam and Lion approach the others for 
the first time after he is trained, “the hounds rushed out to meet them and stopped, 
except the young one which still had but little judgment” (208). The older hounds 
see Lion and understand not only how powerful he is, but also that they are below 
him. Consequently, they let him approach them, not the other way around. Lion 
does not demand respect or assert himself like Buck or Spitz do. The narrator 
portrays Lion as almost apathetic, until something gets in his way, like the 
younger dog. Lion leads the pack, not because he commands, but because he does 
as he pleases in regard to the other dogs (210). In regard to the humans, he does as 
they please for the most part, but not because there is any sort of punishment 
awaiting him. The text suggests he merely knows his place and acts accordingly. 
Yet, the narrator does not imply any sort of romantic or affective relationship 
between Lion and the other humans. By his separation from the other dogs 
through his power and status amongst them, and by “[caring] about no man and 
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no thing” (208-209), he seems to avoid falling under the influence of both the 
technophiliac narcissism of humans and caninophiliac narcissism, or, humans 
tendency to think “that dogs restore human beings’ souls by their unconditional 
love” (33). While the humans are not able to impose their ideas of dogs as tools or 
dogs as unconditional lovers onto Lion entirely, they are able to place him 
somewhere in between these two ideals. The narrator acknowledges that Lion 
cares about nothing, loves nothing, yet Boon still seems to entertain some form of 
intimacy with him. In addition to this, the human characters understand that Lion 
is not entirely tame, but they still manage to get him to hunt Old Ben.  
Through understanding the ways that the dogs of Go Down, Moses and 
The Call of the Wild are understood and trained and the modes in which they 
operate with humans and each other, we gain a more full conception of the 
natureculture built up within these two texts. For London, it is encompassed by 
the primordial, filled with dogs and men who are “savages, all of them, who 
[know] no law but the law of club and fang” (31). The hunt is at the center of 
Faulkner’s natureculture. Revolving around it are the Big Bottom, the land where 
Ike “was the guest and Sam Fathers’ voice the mouthpiece of the host” (163), Old 
Ben, the dogs, Lion, and “worthy blood” (157). The dogs in each story are 
situated in these naturecultures as both tools and companions. However, their 
representation in each story differs significantly. London’s representations of dog 
and human characters are very similar, giving the reader detailed, visceral 
descriptions of the characters’ feelings, actions, and thought processes. In 
contrast, Faulkner has relatively little consistency in the way that he chooses to 
 41 
represent his characters. The narrator reveals a great deal of Ike’s inner thoughts, 
and glimpses of Sam’s, such as when he first realizes that Lion is the dog they’re 
looking for. However, the reader finds little to no mention of Lion’s experiences 
from his own perspective. While it might seem, then, that London does a better 
job of representing his canine characters, I find the question of how dog’s physical 
experience should be represented is rather elusive. If we take London’s route, we 
risk anthropocentric representations that assume we are much more alike to our 
interspecies companions than we may actually be. Faulkner’s method also risks 
anthropocentrism, but in a different way; it privileges only on the perspective of 
the human, leaving the subjectivity, lived experience, and expression of those two 
of the animal out of the equation.  
Consequently, I find the question of how dogs should be represented, in 
this case, to be less productive than inquiring into how the dogs fit into their 
respective naturecultures, and then evaluating the degree to which those positions 
provide the responses to our companion species that we are morally that we are 
bound to. Both authors mythologize the feral dog, making them a ghost, a thing 
that does not truly exist. Their conceptions of breed and how it affects dogs, while 
not as problematic, still lead to a certain degree of reductive taxonomization. 
London does this through negation, saying what Buck is not, whereas Faulkner 
states outright what Lion is. Consequently, it might be easier to problematize 
Faulkner. Yet, both are deserving of further speculation. They each, in their own 
way, make admirable attempts at emulating productive dog-human relationships 
that acknowledge the importance of intersubjectivity. In The Call of the Wild, 
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London displays dogs and humans working together as unequal parts of a whole 
to accomplish a mutually desired task. Similarly, Faulkner shows harsh 
communication tactics between equally stubborn subjects that results in a form of 
a mutually beneficial working relationship. 
However, these representations do not exist in a vacuum, and neither story 
is just about dogs. To assume this would result in consequences similar to 
assuming either text is merely about humans. In these naturecultures, neither the 
humans nor the dogs can be fully understood with out the other; we must look 
further into “what it means to inherit the multispecies, relentlessly complex legacy 
that crosses evolutionary, personal, and historical time scales of companion 
species” (Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto”, 188). The whole cannot 
be understood without first understanding its parts. Consequently, the next step in 
this process is to inquire into how our close readings of the dogs in each novel can 
help us better examine their human characters.   
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Chapter 3 
  Blood and Biology: 
Native Americans and the Natural-Cultural Inheritance of Companion Species 
      Framing: The Native American Naturecultures 
Previously, we inquired into the ways in which animals are represented 
and how they construct their respective text’s nature/culture binary by acting as 
intermediary characters. With this information, we can then look further into how 
their presence in the text also disrupts the binary in a way that reconstructs it in 
the form of a more objective natureculture. By locating dog characters within 
natureculture, as opposed to being in between nature and culture, we are able to 
prod out inappropriate responses in an effort to discover how we might more 
adequately respond to our canine companions. 
 Outside of the texts in question, and in reality, in our own respective 
naturecultures, we are required to acknowledge our inherited histories, both in 
unison with and separate from the histories of the species we find ourselves in 
companionship with. Throughout this acknowledgement, we find a myriad of 
partial connections, yet rarely do we come upon anything that connects us to our 
companions entirely. Relating, in this sense, is characterized by fragmentation and 
recognition of where our boundaries are permeable.  
 In relating ourselves to our dog companions, especially in light of what we 
can learn from the texts in question, it seems necessary to acknowledge the partial 
relatings between racial and animal others. Racism and humanism share 
discursive ties of othering that link “the colonized, the enslaved, the noncitizen, 
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and the animal” (Haraway, When Species Meet, 18). This is not an equalizing 
statement nor is it comparative. It is a statement implicit in the understanding of 
who is excluded from the norm or the “neutral” rational man of western 
hegemonic culture. 
 In The Call of the Wild and Go Down, Moses, we see these links 
manifesting in multiple ways between the stories’ canine and Native American 
characters. The Native American and the canine each can be situated in the 
categories of the colonized, the enslaved, and the noncitizen. However, they 
diverge from each other in that canines do not bear the weight of the racialized 
other, nor do Native Americans fall into the label of animal other, at least in the 
confines of these texts. However, both parties experience some of the same 
consequences and resultant oppressive structures. 
 This chapter explores the similarities between canine and Native 
American characters within naturecultures in an effort to discover what their 
positions do for the text as a whole, and the problems that arise therein. By 
problematizing the texts, we can find more productive ways of representing and 
responding to our companions, both human and non-human animal. The coupling 
of Go Down, Moses and The Call of the Wild is ideal for this goal because they 
represent inverted narratives. One focuses on a movement towards de-wilding, 
focusing on symbolic inheritance through the symbol of blood, the other towards 
wilding, honing in on concrete biological inheritance through scientific fact and 
observation. Though these two seem to be opposites, we find them reaching 
similar problems: inadequate representations of Native Americans, oppressive 
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locations and roles of their characters, and inadequate responses to the racialized 
others of their stories. 
Representing 
The works of both Faulkner and London supply us with a myriad of 
instances to study race. While Faulkner’s dealings with race seem primarily 
localized to the southern US, London’s narratives represent a number of different 
nationalities, from natives in the Yukon to the islanders depicted in his South Sea 
Tales. That being said, it suits the purpose of the particular subject matter I am 
addressing to limit the analysis of race in these stories to their treatment of 
natives. Specifically, a productive inquiry into the representation of Native 
Americans in these stories will lead us closer to an understanding of how both The 
Call of the Wild and Go Down Moses construct and define their respective 
wildernesses. Furthermore, it will enable us to locate where these texts fail and 
succeed in regards to representation and response as it concerns characters within 
their respective naturecultures. 
Earlier, I wrote of hybridity in dogs. In this hybridity, we find hierarchies, 
power structures, and mechanisms of representation and identity. Hybridity 
matters here in that it is how the characters are represented to the reader and 
understood by the other characters. Blood, breed, nationality: all words and 
concepts that have the possibility of hybridity. In Faulkner, we see a text factoring 
group identity in terms of a symbolic idea of blood. Likewise, London sees an 
importance in one’s broader genealogy, only his texts factor it in terms of the 
concrete: evolution, genetics, atavism. In the texts’ racially marginalized 
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characters, we see a more concrete example of the ways that Faulkner and London 
figure hybridity as it pertains to race. My goal, here, is not to equate ethnic 
identity or race to the breed of dogs. The immediate purpose of this chapter works 
towards displaying how ethnic identity factors into the way we construct and 
understand cultural conceptions of nature and methods of accessing it. This plays 
into the larger end of my thesis in the way that depictions of certain ethnic 
identities, specifically Native Americans, are often located in a similar space as 
canine characters when it comes to how characters interact within fictional 
naturecultures; they are in the middle, a concrete example of nature being 
culturally constructed. By placing such characters in this location and role, they 
are represented as object tools, rather than human subjects, under the guise of 
companions. How might we, with this in mind, work towards more adequate and 
responsible methods of representing and responding towards subjects that become 
objectified as intermediary, accessory figures through which naturecultures are 
understood. 
This line of inquiry starts with issues of representation. How native 
characters are represented in the text matters in the way that it determines the 
degree to which they can be adequately responded to by other characters in the 
text. For instance, François in Call of the Wild is of multiple nationalities, yet that 
factors very little into the narrator’s representation of him. Consequently, both the 
reader and the other characters do not respond to him as a racial other the way that 
they might for Sam Fathers in Go Down, Moses. Being one of the three key 
components to the nature equation that Faulkner constructs in Go Down, Moses, 
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the other two being Old Ben and Lion, Fathers factors in heavily to the way the 
reader understands The Big Bottom. Consequently, we must first look into how 
Fathers is represented to see the full extent to his role in the construction of Go 
Down, Moses’ natureculture.  
To understand Sam, we ought to go further back and see how the narrator 
represents natives as a whole. As Duane Gage notes in “William Faulkner’s 
Indians” (1974), “William Faulkner’s Indians are not history’s Indians” (27). 
While the text might have bits and pieces of historical facts surrounding natives, 
Faulkner’s representation of native characters usually puts their usefulness to his 
overall goal of the text over portraying them in a historically accurate light; they 
are “created from fantasy, lore, and an incidental history to suit the author’s 
needs” (27). As problematic as this immediately sounds, we must remember that 
most characters in Faulkner’s stories are created from a number of resources to 
suit his needs. The real issue, here, is the appropriation of native culture without 
any effort towards sensitivity or accuracy. Similar to the earlier discussion of 
Lion’s character, by creating ahistorical native characters that are primarily native 
in name and potentially appearance, they are reduced to symbols and represented 
as objects. Consequently, we are left with Annette Trefzer’s concept of “the 
Native American Signifier” that she details in Disturbing Indians: The 
Archaeology of Southern Fiction (2007). We see this first manifest in Go Down, 
Moses in the way that the Native Americans of “The Old People” transcend their 
physical embodiment through death; lived experience, here, does not seem to be 
important. The dead natives seem to find a form of embodiment after death where 
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they “actually [walk] in breath and air and casting an actual shadow on the earth 
they had not quitted” (163). As Sam talks to Isaac about the Old People, they 
cease to be dead and “cease to be old times and would become a part of the boy’s 
present” (162). In becoming part of the boys present, the narrator conveys that 
they overpower the boys own existence and make his family’s hold upon the land 
“trivial and without reality” (163). This evidences the power of the memory of the 
old people, but also the clear privileging the narrator has of the mythical and 
symbolic over the concrete and physical. 
When we look further into evidence of the narrator’s dissociation of 
physical reality from the past and spiritual present, we see clear misrepresentation 
compounded on the objectifying representation of symbolism. The narrator seems 
to suggest the natives have merely disappeared, as opposed to being killed off. He 
presents the natives as “those dead and vanished men of another race” (162). He 
avoids describing how those men died, suggesting that they merely “vanished”. 
They did not vanish, however. In the same way that the narrator ignores the theft 
of the native land by the white men, they ignore the systematic extermination of 
the natives from the stolen land. So, while the text recognizes the joint futures of 
Sam and the McCaslin family, it does not necessarily acknowledge all that leads 
up to this future. Instead, we see the text attempting to privilege natives through 
some sort of metaphysical or spiritual existence.  
When it comes to representation of Sam, the man, however, we see things 
become slightly more concrete. To gain an understanding of Sam Fathers’ 
concrete embodiment, one must first understand the physical space he is placed in 
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by the narrator. Sam occupies a strange, ambiguous space within the text for 
many reasons, the chief of which being his bloodline and race. Not only is he part 
black, white, and Chickasaw, but also each portion of his blood seems to contain a 
specific significance that complicates the matter further. He is not just “black 
man”, “white man”, and “red man;” he is part Chickasaw chief, part black slave, 
and part white master. Blood, here, attaches one to specific social roles. As the 
narrator duly notes, the complexity of Sam’s bloodline makes him “himself his 
own battleground, the scene of his own vanquishment, and the mausoleum of his 
defeat” (160).  
Sam amounts to a strange mix of blood that seems to portray him as 
almost white in social status, but not quite. The distinction here is not in the color 
of his skin but in the dignity and respect that he is granted by the white men. 
Because he is the son of a chief, he is dignified in the eyes of the other characters. 
Yet, his black slave ancestry prohibits him from being fully respected and 
acknowledged and enables the white characters in the story to maintain an 
appropriate distance from him. This is seen through McCaslin’s explanation of the 
“something else which you did not notice about [his] eyes, which you noticed 
because it was not always there” (Faulkner 158).  
He was the direct son not only of a warrior but of a chief. Then he grew up and 
began to learn things, and all of a sudden one day he found out that he had been 
betrayed, the blood of the warriors and chiefs had been betrayed. He probably 
never held it against old Doom for selling him and his mother into slavery, 
because he probably believed the damage was already done before then and it was 
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the same warriors’ and chiefs’ blood in him and Doom both that was betrayed 
through the black blood which his mother gave him. (159) 
First, we see the focus being put on Sam’s father being both a warrior and 
a chief: his status in their social sphere. It is the blood of chiefs, not the 
Chickasaw blood, that gives Sam whatever social leg he might have up on other 
natives in the text such as Jobaker. Then, this blood, not Sam, was betrayed. In 
this way, McCaslin diverts the fault away from the actors, the enslavers, and 
towards blood: towards something that only bears the significance that others 
ascribe to it: something that no one can actually take the blame for. He has 
mistaken Sam’s situation as a consequence of his blood, rather than understanding 
the significance of Sam’s blood as a consequence of white oppression. This issue 
evidences the way that the text uses symbols, in this case blood, to divert attention 
away from placing proper blame on subjects or actual physical consequences. It 
seems, then, that the text’s representation of Sam leans more towards symbolic 
representation and avoids representing him as an actual subject with agency. 
Ultimately, this aligns Sam with Lion in they way that their bloodlines, or better 
said the other characters’ interpretations of their bloodlines, make them the 
perfect tools for Ike and the rest of the privileged characters to accomplish their 
goals. Like Lion, whose breed and status allow him to be considered higher in 
status to the other dogs without endangering the power of Cas, Ike, and the other 
more experienced hunters, the cultural interpretations and consequent power 
dynamic forced upon Sam render him to guide and lead the other characters in the 
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way of the hunt without damaging or threatening the authority and status that they 
hold so closely. 
The text disguises this exploitation, however, in part by its championing of 
primitivism, a concept we will see London also encouraging. Kenneth LaBudde, 
in “Cultural Primitivism in William Faulkner’s ‘The Bear’” (1950), points out the 
strong influence of primitive notions of nature, child rearing, and culture in “The 
Bear” specifically. Considering the time that LaBudde was writing, it is no 
surprise that he finds Faulkner’s use of the primitive to evidence his ability to 
balance attitudes towards nature and humanity without injuring either. Regardless 
of the strength of his argument, its reliance on nature and culture being separate 
make it divergent from my own thesis. However, the main issues he points out, 
that Faulkner’s text promotes primitive values within what the natural world it 
constructs and that a primitive upbringing is the main factor that allows Ike to 
have what enlightenment he does, evidence a link between culture, namely 
primitive culture, and non-human subjects. With this, we can surmise that the text 
seems to unintentionally set up a natureculture in which primitive characters reign 
as the knowledge bringers. 
Locating 
Similarly, London finds cultural primitivism to be the most effective 
method of interacting with the non-human world. While The Call of the Wild does 
not have a native character presence as strong as Sam Fathers in Go Down, 
Moses, it does contain both native characters and conceptions and idealizations of 
primitivism. The quantity of these examples at the reader’s disposal to analyze is 
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fairly low compared to those in Go Down, Moses, but they yield a similar quality 
of result. The characters that I plan to discuss are first, the “Hairy Man” that Buck 
sees throughout the text, and second the Yeehats that appear towards the end of 
the text. The narrator does not name the Hairy Man as a Native American, nor 
should we take ethnicity into question since none is suggested. Instead, I find him 
to be linked to the Yeehats that appear later in the text through the notion of 
primitivism. We can trace this connection beginning with John Thornton in the 
way that he hunts, travels, and eats “like the Indian” (71). We might assume, then, 
that the text asserts this as the way that the Yeehats, the only visible “indians” in 
the text, also live: primitively. Consequently, we have the Hairy Man being a 
distant, imagined relative of both the characters mentioned, whether it be by 
ancestry or mode of life.  
 When Buck first encounters this man from “another world” (42), 
we receive the narrator’s perception of the way primitive humans live: “in 
perpetual fear of things seen and unseen” (41). The Hairy Man comes from 
Buck’s ancestor’s past, a time where safety was not as easily accessible and, 
according to the narrator, required strength of both mind and body to survive. 
Once Buck experiences the freedom that John Thornton grants him later on in the 
novel, he begins to see this man even more. This man becomes so real that Buck 
“wandered around with him in that other world which [Buck] remembered” (73). 
This bears a striking similarity to the Old People that, to Ike, manifest physically, 
so much so that they seem to cast shadows. Additionally, the Hairy Man is not 
Buck’s ancestor, similar to how the Old People are not Ike’s. They are the 
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ancestors of their primitive guides, their primitive leaders. In this instance, we see 
Buck being drawn into the wilderness that the text has constructed, similar to 
Ike’s transformation as he leaves behind his cultural artifacts in hopes of seeing 
Old Ben. In both instances, the character is drawn in by a human that symbolizes 
some sort of primitive mindset or time period. This evidences another aspect to 
the guide figures in naturecultures. Not only are they usually represented as being 
in between nature and culture, as we see with Lion and Buck. They are also 
represented as culturally primitive, yet cultured nonetheless. 
Now, if these guide or intermediary figures are located by their respective 
narrators in between nature and culture, where do we find them when the model 
changes to combine, rather than divide, nature and culture? Can we see the Hairy 
Man being Buck’s constituent as a companion species? No, not as he is in the 
story, not to Buck. In simple terms, because he does not exist physically, he 
cannot fit into what we might understand as species. However, in a more 
complicated sense, he is in the world of companion species. He is a visual 
manifestation of Buck’s inherited history brought about by his retrogression into 
the primitive. He gives the reader a chance to acknowledge a harsh, violent past in 
seeing that human-dog relationships have not always been about love or 
happiness, or peaceful relating. In this instance, it is surrounded by fear as the 
main survival instinct and driven by the threat of violence and predation.  
However, this visual representation becomes more concrete and physical 
when Buck confronts the Yeehats. As Buck sits by the fire with the Hairy Man, he 
sees “many gleaming coals, two by two, always two by two, which he knew to be 
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the eyes of great beasts of prey” (42). Yet, these beasts of prey never come, 
neither for the Hairy Man nor for John Thornton and company. Instead, humans 
are the ones who pose the actual threat to Buck’s companions. Buck loses himself 
at the sight of the camp having been attacked by the Yeehats, running “in their 
very midst, tearing, rending, destroying” (82). In a graphically violent upheaval, 
Buck goes against his bond with the human species because of his bond to an 
individual human. While this isn’t necessarily a contradiction, it displays the 
contrary and often violent behaviors we might witness when species meet. In “On 
Primitivism in ‘The Call of the Wild’” (1987), Richard Fusco explains this 
inconsistency as Buck no longer feeling any obligation towards humanity: “His 
only remaining link with civilization lies in his love for Thornton. Consequently, 
Thornton’s death at the hands of the Yeehats releases the dog from all 
obligations” (78). The book tells us why Buck “allowed passion to usurp 
cunning” (82), and Fusco’s argument tells us why Buck is able to leave human 
civilization as a whole after the event with the Yeehats. However, neither explain 
why Buck, as a character, has to kill the natives in such a violent display. It also 
does not explain why London has Native Americans, a made up tribe no less, 
being the instruments of Buck’s release from human bonds. The reader does not 
receive a reason for the Yeehat’s slaughter of Thornton, his crew, or the other 
dogs. 
It might be assumed that Thornton and company were on Yeehat land, so 
it’s only natural that they kill them, especially with Thornton traveling and killing 
valuable game as he does. Other readers might assume that this characterizes the 
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Yeehats as “savage”, killing without reason. However, we are given little 
information to back either of these assumptions up. Instead of answering why, it 
seems more productive to inquire into what their deaths at the hands of the 
Yeehats do for the story and for Buck. This event first, as Fusco notes, leaves 
Buck with no present human bond. However, what follows bears much greater 
significance. It gives Buck a chance to assert himself as the dominant primordial 
beast. The Yeehats, in this instance, act as a gateway for Buck from culture into 
nature. We see this as Buck “contemplate[s] the carcasses of the Yeehats” (83). 
He had killed man, the noblest game of all, and he had killed in the face of the law 
of club and fang. He sniffed the bodies curiously. They had died so easily. It was 
harder to kill a husky dog than them. They were no match at all, were it not for 
their arrows and spears and clubs. Thenceforward he would be unafraid of them 
except when they bore in their hands their arrows, spears, and clubs. (83) 
This is presented as the pinnacle of Buck’s success as a hunter. He first 
kills the rabbit, then the moose, then the Yeehats. The natives are his final hurdle 
in heeding the call of the wild. While his passion, derived from companionate 
affect, enabled him to kill “in the face of the law of club and fang”, his revelation 
enables him to no longer allow “passion to usurp cunning”, and consequently 
surpass the methods of the modern and the primitive commit to the primordial. He 
also acknowledges that technology or cultural artifacts are the only mechanisms 
by which humans become strong. Consequently, he resolves to shun humans and 
their methods of power. Buck has now fully gained his autonomy and began a 
new life. This is evidenced by the canine becoming “alive to a stirring of the new 
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life in the forest other than that which the Yeehats had made” (83). The new life 
the Yeehats had made, in this case, refers to Bucks newfound agency. Part of the 
significance one must note lies in Buck’s new birth being granted by native 
characters. In one sense, they are set up as the last bastion of human culture: 
primitivism. In another sense, however, the narrator attempts to privilege them as 
being generative, even in death. This can be problematic in the way that it seems 
to ignore the lived experienced of marginalized characters. Yes, their death may 
result in some positive change. But, is death the only possible catalyst for these 
changes? 
The notions of Native Americans being generative in death as well as a 
type of border or gatekeeper can also be found in Go Down, Moses. We saw 
earlier how the text suggests that natives of America, through their attachment to 
the land, were somehow able to have an amount of re-generative claim over it, in 
that they exist in it, almost materially, after death. However, we also see Sam’s 
death generating life to a certain degree. Consequently, I also take issue with the 
symbolic deaths of its native and dog characters. It is in their deaths that I find a 
strong link between London’s and Faulkner’s characters. This begins, however, 
with their initial similarities, especially in the spaces that they occupy within the 
natureculture of The Big Bottom. Lion seems to be to Sam what Sam is to Walter, 
Major de Spain, Cas and the white men of the novel. They both lie in ambiguous 
spaces that inhibit the white men’s ability to label them, but do not render the 
white men incapable of oppressing them. This fact gains significance when one 
recalls that it is Sam that trains, or, in a way breaks Lion. Sam understands the 
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place that Lion occupies in a way that Major de Spain and the other white men 
cannot. Major de Spain tells Sam, “you’ll never tame him. How do you ever 
expect to make an animal like that afraid of you” (205). Sam, however, wants 
Lion to have the same relationship with himself as he has with the white men. 
Sam is neither tamed by nor afraid of his masters. But, as we see throughout the 
text, from his asking permission to leave to his request, “let me out, master” 
(232),  he knows he is still subservient to them to a varying degree; this is the 
state he wants Lion to be in. Boon, after watching Sam, realizes that Sam “want[s] 
[Lion] to find out that at last the only way he can get out of that crib and stay out 
of it is to do what Sam or somebody tells him to do” (208). Lion, in order to have 
as much freedom as his new masters will allow, must acknowledge their position 
in his life. So, while Sam and Lion do not share the exact same position, they are 
located between similar relationships in their respective hierarchies.  
We might better understand this position through the lens of Jay S. 
Winston’s “Going Native in Yoknapatawpha: Faulkner’s Fragmented America 
and ‘the Indian’” (2002). Sam is characterized by fragmentation and division, 
similar to Winston’s discussion of the translation of “Yoknapatawpha”, reflecting 
“a landscape that is fragmented, divided against itself, compounded on the 
elements of Indian-ness and the destruction of the Indian”. So, Sam’s description 
mirrors the description of the land, the land the narrator says is so inextricably 
linked to the people that were torn from it in order to construct the current society 
that mourns the loss they brought about. Faulkner attempts to point out, and then 
develop, the ways in which “the white man” has wronged the nation and its non-
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white inhabitants. According to Winston, in order to gain a truer connection with 
the land, the inhabitants must gain a better connection to its native inhabitants, or, 
the figure of “the Indian”. Faulkner’s method of transcending the “legacy of 
dispossession” involves transforming the perception of natives from “antagonist 
to ancestor”. While Sam is the primary mode through which the text evidences 
this assertion, it can also be found throughout the text. One could extend 
Winston’s argument to say that, in order to accomplish this task, Sam and the 
other native characters must die. In life, one cannot form any sort of blood 
relation spontaneously. This is why Ike and Cas seem to have so much trouble 
connecting with and understanding Sam and end up speaking for him. Sam can 
take the role of Ike’s father, but he cannot become a true blood relation within the 
schema of the dominant culture surrounding the natureculture of the Big Bottom. 
Consequently, Sam must become something slightly more abstract: an ancestor, 
something that requires death. The transformation from relative to ancestor 
requires death. So, Sam Fathers, the living man, cannot accomplish the role the 
text sets for him in its entirety as he lives.  
The consequences of locating Sam, and the figure of Native Americans, in 
this position, as dead ancestor, are problematic at best and dangerously dire as we 
get closer to the worst. While Faulkner’s intentions are no doubt good in 
attempting to bridge the gap between races and the American South’s violent 
histories and inheritance, this cannot be done at the cost of objectifying and 
silencing a human with a body into the realm of symbol. This end only 
dehumanizes via different means, rather than promoting the mutual understanding 
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and respect across ethnicities through recognizing, owning and repairing a 
damaged past. Without respect and co-acknowledgement of each other’s agencies, 
no two parties can begin to respond. Inadequate response, here seems to be both a 
cause and a result of both texts methods of approaching differences between 
species, generations, and race. Faulkner is shut out of appropriately responding by 
his symbolic view of blood and ancestry, whereas London seems held back by the 
atavistic memories and primal hierarchies he places upon his characters.  
Responding 
 In Haraway’s discussion of Jacques Derrida’s “And Say the Animal 
Responded” in When Species Meet, she acknowledges how productive and 
important considering this question is, but asks us to consider to what degree we 
ourselves are actually responding, and if our response is appropriate to our 
companions. In analyzing the way that Sam Fathers, the Hairy Man, and the 
Yeehats are responded to, it is helpful to notice what Haraway says Derrida seems 
to get right, for lack of a better term, and where he seems to fall short. First, he 
productively moves away from considering whether or not the animal can speak, 
and instead tries to differentiate between a response from his cat and a reaction. 
Yet, he does not take this further and consider how one might meet the gaze of a 
non-human animal. Second, he does not step onto the slippery slope of “claiming 
to see from the point of view of the other”, (20) but in doing so fails to see 
animals “as beings who look back and who’s look [his] own intersects” (21). I 
find each of the texts in question here to make both mistakes, but to varying 
degrees. The Call of the Wild seems to write about and observe its racial others in 
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a way that merely describes them instead of responding to or meeting their gaze. 
Go Down, Moses, on the other hand seems to engage Native Americans, like its 
animals, “only as literary and mythological figures” (21). The text affords the 
characters neither the ability nor the chance to look back. 
 As mentioned earlier, Cass and the other older hunters seem to ignore Sam 
Father’s state within their society. Cass especially attempts to speak for Sam on 
multiple occasions, as mentioned earlier. Sam Fathers is continuously represented 
on other characters’ terms, spoken for by other characters who share neither his 
perspective nor his background, and pushed into roles by the text that seem 
uninvolved with his desires as a subject. In Ike’s discussion with Cass about Sam 
and the look in his eyes, Cass speaks for Sam, telling Ike and the reader that Sam 
“was born in a cage and had been in it all his life; he knows nothing else. That’s 
what makes his eyes look like that” (159). Whether this is true or not, the text 
gives no indication that this has ever come from Sam’s mouth. Cass fails to 
respect Sam in that he does not meet his gaze. Instead, Cass tries to interpret his 
gaze, or see what he sees. He surmises that “his cage aint us” (160), which isn’t 
incorrect, but seems to ignore the point of what he has ultimately discovered: Sam 
is not free. He may be treated well by the hunters; he may be given free rein to do 
as he pleases while in their company, but this cage exists beyond The Big Bottom. 
In essence, whatever freedom or agency he has is not something he can own 
entirely. Cass’ response to Sam’s gaze, then, can be characterized by 
mythologizing and symbolizing.  
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 Conversely, Ike’s response is characterized by shame. After Sam’s death, 
Ike comes to his terrible realization of his family’s past and ancestry. He can only 
respond to this information with shame that causes him to retreat and ignore his 
own legal claim over the land. While Ike’s shame deals with former slaves and 
non-natives and their relationship to the McCaslin family’s hold on the land, I still 
find a connection, here, with Sam Fathers. Now that Sam has become part of “the 
blood hot and strong for living, pleasuring, that has soaked back into [the land]” 
(177), he becomes a part of Ike’s inherited history that he cannot accept. To a 
certain degree, Ike productively realizes that people cannot claim the land as the 
generations before him had imagined they could. However, his revelation stops 
there. It stops short at shame, an unproductive, selfish response. Additionally, in 
his response towards his inherited history, rejecting his claim upon the land also 
rejects his inheritance as a whole, which implies Ike attempting to wash his hands 
of the family guilt. Alternatively, Ike could have considered his inheritance, both 
the violence and the joy, and responded in a way that met the gaze that he reacted 
to in shame. In order to do this, however, Ike would have to reject the perspective 
that enabled him to come to this conclusion in the first place: the mythologizing 
of the land. Breaking with this tradition seems too much for Ike. 
 Similarly, Buck has trouble responding correctly because of his 
attachments. In the case of his attack on the Yeehats, Buck reacts. He does not 
respond. Additionally, Buck seems to merely react to the Hairy Man, following 
him with little to no explanation. They do not interact on the intimate, though 
violent, level that Buck and the Yeehats do. Furthermore, it is difficult to fully 
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analyze Buck’s response to the native characters in the text because of his shared 
space with them in the natureculture of London’s Klondike wilderness. 
Consequently, it seems more productive to examine how the text itself responds 
to the existence and gaze of the native characters it includes. Instead of shame, the 
text’s response to its biological and racial others is characterized by fear and 
violence.  
 As mentioned earlier, the representations of both the Hairy Man and the 
Yeehats limits itself to appearance, whether that be the matted hair and primitive 
mannerisms of the Hairy Man or the “savage” dancing and chanting of the 
Yeehats. In this way, I find the text’s response to its primitive characters to be 
lacking in the way that it takes the role of the observer, denying the observed 
subjectivity through a refusal to meet its gaze. Similar to the way that Cass 
attempts to figure out what Sam is looking at, that look in his eye, the narrator of 
The Call of the Wild focuses on what the Hairy Man is looking at, assuming their 
self, the narrator, to be outside of the field of vision. In this case, the narrator 
might find a more productive method of response were they to put themselves 
under the same pretense the other characters are in; the narrator could allow 
themselves to also be observed. Instead, the narrator decides to take a more 
traditionally scientific approach, engaging with the primitive man “as [an] object 
of their vision, not as beings who look back and whose look their own intersects” 
(Haraway, When Species Meet, 21). All the reader can understand from the 
representation of the Hairy Man, then, is fear. In science’s terms, or at least the 
science of London’s day, early humans knew only fear for the sake of survival.  
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 This reason for this fear later manifests in the ambush of the Yeehats. Not 
having been given a reason for the Yeehat’s attack, when looking into the way 
they are represented, leads us to the conclusion that they are savages, typical of 
early representations of Native Americans. When analyzing this lack of evidence 
from the perspective of the texts response to their existence, however, we can 
interpret this as the text refusing to meet their gaze. The narrator does not even 
attempt to see from the point of view of the Yeehats, as they do with the Hairy 
Man. They simply observe. The response that arises from this observation 
manifests through Buck’s violent attack. Violence, like shame, “is not an adequate 
response to our inheritance of multispecies histories, even at their most brutal” 
(Haraway, When Species Meet, 23). We might overlook Buck’s violence due to 
the nature of his character and his desire to avenge Thornton, but presentation of 
this response must give the reader pause as to the consequences of refusing to 
meet the gaze of another during violent points of contact. 
 As we have seen throughout these analyses, neither London nor Faulkner 
probably intended to display such problematic representations of any of their 
characters. From Winston, we saw that Faulkner’s intentions were most likely 
well meaning. In London’s case, we have a dog-story set in the Klondike that 
already could not help but be violent due to the time and place it is set in. In many 
cases, I have pointed out issues and problems within each text in order to bring to 
light what we should avoid when representing subjects that we find to be central 
to any natureculture. In these cases, I find no defense for either text or author. For 
example, the way that Go Down, Moses seems to ignore the lived experience of 
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Lion and Sam for the sake of holding them up as mythical characters cannot be 
excused. However, there are other instances in which the purpose of the analysis 
primarily serves to illustrate consequences that the text seems to purposely 
evidence. Earlier, we looked at Cass and Ike’s response to the injustices brought 
upon Sam. While Cass is not entirely in the right, he does overcome obstacles that 
halt Ike for the remainder of the novel. Specifically, he acknowledges shame as an 
inadequate response in saying that “there is only one thing worse than not being 
alive, and that’s shame” (177). In looking ahead towards Ike’s later decisions in 
the novel, we could assume that the text is also asserting that Ike has made an 
inadequate response.  
As with their treatment of their dog characters, The Call of the Wild and 
Go Down, Moses pose significant problems, consequences and solutions. What 
seem at first to be nature stories are actually acutely developed, ingrained, 
examples of naturecultures that can often be mistaken for dualistic battles 
between the natural and the artificial. These naturecultures rely upon many 
different kinds of relatings. One such relating involves the partial connections 
between dog and Native American characters. The ethical implications 
surrounding these characters are deeply involved with the concept of inheritance, 
whether it be Faulkner’s symbolic bloodline inheritance, or London’s concrete 
biological inheritance. Yet, neither seem overtly concerned with inheriting the 
multispecies history, in all of its work, play, joy, and brutality. Approaching these 
characters within the realm of myth and symbolism, or science and fact, whether 
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in the processes of construction or analysis, results in inadequate representations, 
oppressive locations, and inadequate responses. 
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Chapter 4 
From Pack to Kennel: 
Working Towards a Literary “Becoming With” 
 In “Writing the Wolf: Canine Tales and North American Environmental-
Literary Tradition” (2011), Karen Jones details the cultural changes in opinions 
and understandings of the wolf in North American Environmental literature and 
history. Specifically, Jones argues that storytellers’ representations of animals and 
ecological concerns matter significantly more than we usually assume when we 
compare them to the impacts of scientific observation. For instance, she cites 
Thomas Dunlap’s Saving America’s Wildlife (1988) in explaining how some 
“situated the redemption of the ‘big bad wolf’ in the professionalization of the 
wildlife community and emerging debates about biotic health and integrity” 
(203). In this case, scientific observation allowed the popular image of the wolf to 
shift from societal antagonist to ecological regulator. In this story, the wolf moves 
away from being a literary figure of folklore and towards a being within a 
biodiverse environment. However, Jones takes issue with this argument primarily 
on the grounds that it is void of affect, and therefore lacking the “rhetorical guides 
to action in framing our (positive) engagements with other species.  
 Within this argument, a tension between science and sentiment surfaces. 
While one might find the root a subjective/objective binary, it seems that writers 
on either end are looking for more accurate depictions of wolves; they are both 
after some sort of objectivity. Both the scientist and the novelist are, for the most 
part, attempting to present animals “as they really are” (204). In their quest for the 
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objective narrative, the writer draws their credibility from some sort of 
detachment from either the subject, in the scientists case, and the object, in the 
case of the poet. However, Jones accurately acknowledges that “authorial claims 
of detachment always [fall] short, whether written up as a biological report or 
short story” (204). Perhaps, the question of accurate representation can be found 
in affect and interaction with, not detachment from. 
 Jones’ assertion that we need contributions from both the scientific and 
literary communities in order to construct productive cross-species relationships 
and representations finds itself ideologically in line with Harraway’s argument in 
When Species Meet (2008); both writers acknowledge the need to break away 
from the roles of both the scientific observer and the literary mythologizer. Jones 
seems to believe that this has at least in part been done when it comes to the 
representation of the wolf and the wolf pack. She sees the results of this change in 
the 1995 reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone. What might have been seen as 
a scientific break away from the negative mythology of the wolf can actually be 
interpreted as “the emergence of a new story about Canis Lupus” (203), a result 
partially of, rather than a response against, literary representations of wolves. My 
intention in bringing up Jones, here, is to show how literary representations 
matter, not just when speaking of wolves, but also when writing about their more 
domesticated siblings: dogs.  
Do we see the same change in the kennel as we do in the pack? To a 
degree, we cannot. This is primarily because dogs and wolves are figured in 
different terms, whether they be negative or positive. On the negative side, the 
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wolf is seen as an assailant of property or dangerous beast. For dogs, reductive 
representations could span anywhere from representation of pitbulls as violent 
dogs to the infantalization we see many dog owners placing upon their canine 
companions. The contrast, here, lies in the breadth of the consequences. Jones 
gives us a valuable look into the consequences of misrepresenting wolves, but the 
same task would prove much more difficult were the subject domesticated dogs. 
This, in part, is because we tend have a different set of assumptions for each breed 
of dog. The task might also prove difficult because the consequences of 
misrepresentation often come in less easily noticed forms. For this reason, I have 
treated both Go Down, Moses and The Call of the Wild as sort of case studies in 
looking further into how we misrepresent dogs and what happens when we do. 
When misrepresentation leads to inadequate response, we not only risk a failure in 
relating on an inter-species level, but also we compromise the well beings of our 
companions. So, it is not enough to just point out where things go wrong. To that 
end, I find it beneficial to call attention to pieces that seem to display more 
productive representations of dogs and ways of interacting with companion 
species. 
Productive Representations and Responses 
While I have spent a majority of my analysis of the two texts in problematizing 
them, I find there are a small amount of instances in which we might find 
productive examples of inter-species relating. It would not be fair to either text to 
completely write them off as inadequate. Additionally, the goal, here, is not to 
come up with an exact method of relating to either canine or Native American 
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others. This would be counterproductive in that it would privilege a type of 
objectivity that would belittle, if not completely purge, the role of affect in the 
task of relating. Instead, I am looking for partial connections that produce positive 
elements in relationships between companion characters. By compiling these 
positive elements, we might be able to paint a more full picture of what it means 
to inherit the multi-species, both the ugly and beautiful, in a way that avoids the 
tragedies we see in both stories. 
The two characters I find the most potential in for this task are Boon 
Hogganbeck in Go Down, Moses and John Thornton in The Call of the Wild. 
While neither display perfect relationships to the canine or Native American 
characters in their respective texts, both seem to function in ways that diverge 
from the oppressive or passive tendencies of the other characters in positions of 
privilege. We see Boon questioning his own motives and ability to relate to Lion 
while simultaneously disrupting the racial hierarchy of the text. John Thornton’s 
character displays an alternative relationship between human and dog that 
emulates one positive outcome of responding and communicating appropriately.  
In the case of Go Down, Moses, the text evidences layers of various 
hierarchies and power structures. These hierarchies are often implied, though 
never explicitly stated. Think back to the discussion of Cas and his displacement 
of blame from concrete oppressive structures to abstract blood in order to explain 
why Sam’s locational ontology. We also see a hierarchy amongst animals, both 
human and non-human, with the smaller game animals being at the bottom, 
leading all the way to Old Ben at the top, leaving the hunting dogs somewhere in 
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the middle, depending on which dog you are. Yet, these structures tend to overlap 
at times, like when Old Ben comes in contact with Ike, or when the narrator talks 
about Old Ben, Lion, and Sam together. The hierarchies themselves are disrupted 
by their boundaries being muddled.  
Boon’s actions throughout the text highlight the muddling of these 
boundaries. The presence of his character first affirms the human hierarchy of 
ethnicities through his treatment of his own blood. We are told Boon has 
Chickasaw blood in him, but the narrator finds it significant enough to mention 
that “it was not chief’s blood” (161). It seems that Boon also finds this significant. 
While sober, Boon is known to have “resented with his hard and furious fists the 
intimation of one single drop of alien blood” (215). Boon understands the 
importance of purity of blood. He looks white, and is only a quarter Chickasaw, 
but he must defend against anyone asserting that that quarter of non-white blood 
reduces his whiteness and his consequent claims to privilege. However, “usually 
after whisky” (215), Boon also argues “with the same fists and the same fury that 
his father had been the full-blood Chickasaw and even a chief” (215). So, with the 
prompting of whisky, Boon’s lips loosen enough to assert a lie that will 
nevertheless allow him to claim his own ancestry. Here, the distinguishing factor 
is again, like with Sam, that it is chief’s blood both Sam and Boon claim. Boon 
rejects the common Chickasaw blood, but accepts the chief’s blood. This affirms 
Sam’s place on the hierarchy and the reason for it: though native blood might put 
one below white blood, chief’s blood is higher up than that of the common native.  
 71 
Conversely, Boon disrupts the hierarchy through his relationship to Lion and Sam 
during Lion’s training. By aligning himself closer to Lion and doing Sam’s work 
for him, Boon seems to lower himself on the hierarchy. However, if one views 
this situation between the three characters as separate from the rest of the 
plantation life, it actually represents a sub-hierarchy between those with native 
blood. Consequently, it affirms the existence of hierarchies in a different way. 
Before Lion is introduced into the story, Boon’s place in the hunt seems to be as 
the master of the dogs (156, 170). The dogs are to Boon as Walter’s rifle is to 
Walter: they are their chosen tools. For instance, when Boon comes across the 
massive buck in “The Old People” he does not ask for his gun, he tells the others 
to “get the dogs, get the dogs” (170). Haraway mentions how “man makes himself 
by realizing his intentions in his tools, such as domestic animals (dogs)” (“The 
Companion Species Manifesto”, 33). Consequently, in addition to being pets, 
dogs have been used as tools for “hauling, hunting, and herding for various 
peoples” (“The Companion Species Manifesto”, 13). Boon uses the dogs to make 
himself and accomplish what he desires, thus revealing him as under “a neurosis 
[Haraway] calls humanist technophiliac narcissism” (“The Companion Species 
Manifesto”, 33). Until Sam captures Lion, Boon sees animals as tools that help 
him establish his domain: the dogs are his central means of power. However, Lion 
disrupts this power by asserting his own strength. Boon realizes quickly that, 
though Lion has been trained, Lion is not a tool through which Boon can make 
himself.  Boon seems captivated by Lion when he nonchalantly strikes the smaller 
dog as it approaches him. In seeing Lion’s power, Boon forgets his own authority 
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over the dogs. Instead of asserting himself like he does with the other dogs, he 
vocally wonders, “will he let me touch him” (208). Boon feels “the bones and 
muscles, the power” (208) of Lion and is humbled when compared to the dog.  
Boon then attaches himself to Lion in a very strange way. He “takes over 
Lion’s feeding from Sam” (209) and even sleeps with the dog. It might be 
assumed that this relationship comes up form Boon’s interest in Lion being the 
dog that will help them hunt Old Ben. However, when one looks at this 
interaction in regards to the hierarchy of agencies and how this hierarchy relates 
to race and embodiment, a different reasoning seems to surface. Boon’s power is 
not only belittled by Lion, but it is also usurped by Sam. If Boon is usually the 
one who handles the dogs, Sam’s training of Lion undermines Boon’s authority 
over the dogs. This undermining, combined with Boon’s respect for Lion’s power, 
seems to be at the root of how Boon’s relationship to Lion and Sam disrupts the 
hierarchy that places white men at the top. While enclosed in the world that the 
three of them make up, Boon’s Chickasaw heritage seems to carry more 
significance. In having his power both belittled and usurped, Boon’s whiteness 
has, in a way been undermined. The hierarchy remains intact, then, by viewing 
Boon’s position between Lion and Sam through his Chickasaw blood, not his 
white blood. The narrator identifies Boon in this situation through “his touch of 
remote Indian blood”, not through his white blood. In this context, Sam is the 
chief at the top of the hierarchy, Boon is below him, lacking the blood of chiefs, 
and Lion is below the two of them. 
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While each context, Boon with the white characters and Boon with Sam 
and Lion, seems to display a clear hierarchical structure, the clarity disappears 
when the situations are looked at as parts to a whole. Boon’s existence seems to 
be the primary factor enabling the breakdown of the hunter’s conception of 
hierarchy and the hunt. Sam, while complicated, can easily be placed into 
whatever category the hunters wish. As the text evidences earlier, Cas and the 
others have managed to symbolize Sam’s heritage in a way that keeps him where 
they need him without implicating their role in the oppressive structure. The 
muddling of racial hierarchies mirrors the way Boon’s existence also deconstructs 
the mythologizing of animals in the hunters’ lore. As Christina M. Colvin points 
out in “‘His Guts are all out of Him’: Faulkner’s Eruptive Animals” (2014), 
Boon’s words in reference to Lion, “his guts are all out of him” (229), herald the 
collapse of “the ontological category ‘animal’” (94) in Go Down, Moses. He 
verbalizes the physical existence of animal bodies and forces the other characters 
to acknowledge that animals are not just figures and signifiers of wilderness myth.  
Before this, however, the text displays a profound, though subtle, change in Boon 
that results from observation and introspection. Boon at first seems to lack the 
ability to recognize Lion as anything other than the dog that will kill Old Ben. He 
reevaluates his relationship to Lion after the two come in contact with Old Ben. 
Lion does what Boon expects of him and engaged with the bear. Boon, on the 
other hand, attempts to shoot and misses five times “with Lion looking right at 
[him]” (214). After the event, Boon seems to realize he has failed in properly 
responding to Lion and is consequently not “fit to sleep with him” (214) or be in 
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any way superior to him. This can also be seen as more than just a matter of 
physical superiority, seeing as Boon managed to get the better of Lion when 
fighting “hand-to-hand” (213) on the way back to camp. Boon understands he has 
broken the agreement, if there ever was one, between himself and the dog and 
therefore cannot interact in the same way. 
We see the full extent of this acknowledgement later on in the text. Boon, 
having realized the first time around that he would not be able to kill Old Ben 
with a gun, refrains from shooting. Instead, he attacks Old Ben with a knife in 
melee combat. He fights with Lion. The three fighting together, not in the 
detached way of human shooting from a distance, but all three animals, both 
human and non-human, engaged physically depicts an image that suggests not 
necessarily equality, but a closeness of engagement the novel has yet to show. 
Then, after the fight, Lion’s disemboweled body “reveals how the bodies of 
animals violently disrupt the hunters’ abstractions” (Colvin 103). They must 
acknowledge the physical existence and lived experience of the animals that make 
the hunt possible. Boon, seemingly the only hunter concerned with Lion’s state, 
desperately repeats: “Easy, goddamn it, Can’t you see his guts are all out of him?” 
(229). While Colvin argues that Boon’s hysteria is a result of Lion’s guts proving 
he is not an abstraction, I believe one might just as effectively argue that it Boon 
reacts this way precisely because he has come to this realization without having to 
see the dog turned inside out. For the other hunters, “Lion’s guts make his role as 
a symbolic, figural animal unsustainable” (103). But, for Boon, this understanding 
of Lion faded the moment he decided to no longer make the dog sleep with him. It 
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is Boon that calls our attention to Lion’s material existence, and not another 
hunter, precisely because he has met the gaze of Lion; he has seen Lion because 
“[he] missed five times. With Lion looking right at [him]” (214). It is only in the 
failure of both himself and his belief systems that he is able to attempt to make an 
appropriate response to the dog. 
John Thornton, on the other hand, seems to meet the gaze of Buck without 
having any sort of traumatic event. While it is difficult to say whether Boon or 
Thornton respond appropriately, it is evident that they at least make attempts. 
They both try to meet the needs of their canine companions and respect them as 
more than things to think or work with. Thornton, especially, seems to take 
special care for Buck from the moment they meet.  
We meet Thornton as Charles, Mercedes, and Hal come to a stop in his 
camp. Thornton is immensely troubled by the sight of Hal beating Buck. The text 
suggests Thornton hesitates so as not to mix himself up in anyone else’s business, 
but eventually it becomes too much for him. Springing upon Hal, threatening to 
kill him, Thornton becomes the first named character in the text to attack another 
human. While it seems simple, Thornton wishes to ease the pain of the dog he 
sees being beaten, he also abandons all the other dogs in the team and the three 
humans do die by drowning in the freezing river. The issue follows as thus: if 
Thornton does nothing, Buck will be beaten to death and all of the other 
characters will die. He cannot take all of the dogs, because that will leave the 
humans to die. Hal obviously will not be deterred from his dangerous path, so 
Thornton, recognizing the needs of Buck, must make a moral compromise. 
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Thornton’s ability to compromise reflects his adaptability in appropriately 
engaging with and recognizing the needs of other companion species. For 
instance, when Buck saves him from drowning in the river, it is not his own 
injuries that cause him to halt the group’s progress. After finding three broken ribs 
on Buck, Thornton forces the rest of the group to make camp “till Buck’s ribs 
knitted and he was able to travel” (66). Again, the text displays a productive, 
reciprocal relationship between Buck and Thornton at the end of “For the Love of 
a Man” at the Eldorado Saloon. Knowing that the dog could not fully understand 
that Thornton’s entire livelihood up to this point depended on Buck’s ability to 
haul the heavily laden sled, Thornton tries to not pressure Buck. As Buck hauls 
the sled, Thornton follows, not with a whip or anything that a musher might 
typically used to spur a dog forward, but with “short, cheery words” (70) of 
encouragement. While, at base, we have humans betting on dogs, an extremely 
violent and insidious premise in certain settings, we also have companions in 
mutually beneficial contact. Thornton wins the money, which was most likely not 
his primary motive, seeing as he rejects the offer to sell Buck to double his 
profits. Buck, in turn, wins not only the affirmation of Thornton, which he desires, 
but also the ability to follow Thornton and Co. into the wilderness where he will 
eventually have some of his most fulfilled days as a domesticated working dog. 
Unlike Buck’s interaction with the man in the red sweater, the relationship 
between Thornton and Buck revolves around mutual recognition gained through 
positive affect, not violence and constraint.  
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The love between Buck and Thornton has often been interpreted as either 
a bestial love or a metaphor for homoerotic human love, as Michael Lunblad 
points out in “From Animal to Animality Studies” (2009). While it might be 
tempting to read London’s animals as “men in furs” (496), seeing them as saying 
more about humans than the animal bodies they reside in, I find these readings to 
verge on reductive, anthropocentric readings. Yet, it is difficult to counter such 
readings, especially when considering how erotic the descriptions of Buck and 
Thornton’s love get in the text. Lunblad’s idea of an animality studies, in addition 
to animal studies, seems to give us an opportunity to read Buck as an actual 
animal while simultaneously recognizing the way the text might be working him 
into a signifier position. In this way, Buck is a real animal within the text. From 
without, we can still work under this assumption while also looking further into 
the ways that his animality relates to other potential assertions about humans the 
text might attempt to make. This falls in line with my own thesis in the way that it 
does not separate or ignore connections between human and non-human animals, 
nor does it reject the historical fact that humans have constructed countless 
systems of meaning making through both physical animals and the ontological 
category of “the animal”.  
So, without countering the readings that see a problematic bestiality or 
metaphorical homoerotic tensions between Thornton and Buck, we can also read 
an affect that affirms the possibility of productive relations between companion 
species, even within a harsh wilderness setting. The text makes this possible 
through telling the story from the third person of Buck’s perspective. Writing 
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from the perspective of an animal is extremely difficult and often problematic, as 
we have seen from The Call of the Wild. However, London’s work seems much 
more well intentioned than its results point out. In his own words, London was 
attempting to offer his best scientific rendition of an animal’s perspective. He 
repeatedly stresses the motive of instinct, rather than in-depth reasoning, because 
his own scientific learning indicated that was how animals functioned. London 
wished to impart a “rubric of evolutionary thought to his readers” (Jones 212). 
While London’s writing was, supposedly, informed by current evolutionary 
thought, he also wrote from “his empirical (and thus scientific) approach to wolf 
behavior, having assessed his dogs Rollo and Glen as canine subjects for evidence 
of reasoned thinking” (212). While we have no way of knowing how in depth 
London’s observations were, it seems that he is attempting to make an effort to 
avoid being solely the scientific, detached observer. He understood that, if he 
wishes to adequately portray his dog characters, he must not only observe dogs 
from the outside, but also live with dogs as part of a community, as companions. 
This led him to “counter critics Theodore Roosevelt and John Burroughs” (212) in 
“The Other Animals” with a compelling call to action: “You must not deny your 
relatives, the other animals. Their history is your history. What you repudiate in 
them you repudiate in yourself” (Jones quoting London 212). While it may not 
pan out entirely in his texts, and while his understanding of history may not be 
entirely accurate, he seems to be on the right track. London seems to acknowledge 
that our readings of animals should not claim that they say more about humans 
than they do animals. Even if this were so, our histories do not pre-exist one 
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another outside of relating; whatever we have to say about one, human or non-
human animals, we have to say about the other.  
Regardless of intentions, neither Faulkner nor London get things entirely 
right or wrong when it comes to their literary representations of animals. 
However, getting things completely right, or pointing out the entirely wrong, does 
not need to be our goal. In both representing and analyzing representations, we 
have a higher chance of coming to productive conclusions if we hone in on partial 
connections and elements of texts that seem to get things right. For instance, 
London might not have been entirely correct, but according to the science of his 
time, he was not far off. Considering how scientific discovery changes our 
perceptions, we have a very small likelihood of representing dog perceptions 
adequately. We can only get as close as our resources allow.  
Productive Inheriting 
One of these resources lies in the past, in our failures. Without acknowledging 
these failures, we cannot fully embrace our various interconnected histories with 
our companion species. By looking at animal representations in literature, we can 
trace where things go wrong and the consequences that those inadequate 
representations lead to. For Faulkner, we see a mythologized hunt resulting in the 
marginalization and death of the characters that signify that myth. London’s 
fiction, in contrast, displays how a focus on objectivity and science becomes void 
of affect and ultimately ignores the subjectivity of living beings. Both Faulkner 
and London fail on multiple levels in their attempts to understand the animals 
they depict as separate from the ontological category of the animal. This lack of 
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understanding contributes to their misrepresentation of the dog characters. This, in 
turn, leads to an inappropriate response to the companion animals, both from the 
author and from the characters in the story.  
Putting effort into more productively engaging in these three efforts, 
understanding, representing, and responding, can lead to not only a fiction but a 
reality that treats dogs as companions, not as “a projection, nor the realization of 
an intention . . . . [but as] a species in obligatory, constitutive, historical, protean 
relationship with human beings” (Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto”, 
103). In this reality, dog characters and representations only tell us about humans 
because dog and human histories and presents are about each other, at least in 
part, not because dogs can be convenient signifiers for the wilderness, the human 
condition, or the divide between nature and culture. The latter of these three can 
be easily mistaken, seeing as dogs do often aid humans in navigating through less 
artificial settings. The key, here, is distinguishing between literal and symbolic 
representations.  
Neither dogs nor Native Americans are spiritual guides through nature for the 
“cultured”. The reason they have been spoken of at length in juxtaposition is 
because the texts themselves speak of them in the same way. As I have stated 
earlier, whatever similarities we find between dogs and Native Americans are a 
fault of the text, not an assumption of my own. Partially because of this, I have 
refrained from including Native Americans in the immediate paragraphs 
concerning understanding, representation, and response. The way we write and 
should write differs from the way we have written in the past. Consequently, the 
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comparison made in the previous two chapters does not carry over to my own 
conclusions and solutions.  
My goal, in all of this, has been to find more productive ways of writing 
and reading dog stories, both fictional and non fictional. To this end, we might 
ideally find better ways of responding to actual dogs: our pets, our coworkers, 
those whom we have grown up with, both as a species and as individuals. Dogs 
cannot write for themselves, whereas Native Americans can. This seems to be the 
most obvious reason why I would not think of discussing how we ought to 
represent indigenous people of the American continents; they have the possibility 
of representing themselves through human language. So, perhaps I could leave it 
at this; those who tell stories should not tell the stories of others who are capable 
of doing so themselves. I’m thinking here of Faulkner, showing no reverence for 
Chickasaw culture, burying Sam in his book in the method typically used by 
Choctaw natives (Howell 524) and the way that he constructed ahistorical natives 
to fit his own design. London is no less at fault, making up a non-existent 
“savage” native group, the Yeehats, giving them no voice or action other than the 
primal slaughtering of Thornton and his company.  
These Native American characters and the dogs both share a common role in their 
respective texts; they are mechanisms through which the author’s display the 
divide between nature and culture. They are characters that enable the privileged, 
usually white male humans to interact with a symbolic myth of the past, the 
unadulterated wilderness. By reconstructing the binary of nature and culture into 
natureculture, we make the first step towards understanding the guide function as 
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only a piece of the characters’ complexities, not the central point of their 
significance. What follows is the breakdown of their signifying role and the 
mythology they signify.  
For dog characters, this could start with working towards better 
understandings, representations, and responses. Now, I would like to offer up a 
few pieces, both fiction and non-fiction, that I find to make conscientious attempts 
at engaging with companion species as more than just a moving body in the 
ontological category of the animal. Some of these pieces need only be looked at 
briefly and others merit a more in depth response. The point, here, is not to find 
the pieces that offer the best solutions or representations. While the pieces that I 
have chosen are not random, the purpose behind the breadth between each 
example lies in the importance of recognizing how dog representations are 
extensively embedded within artistic works. Rather than defining or locating a 
perfect example of a dog story, I am looking at possibilities of productive 
narratives that involve companion species.  
The first I would like to nod towards is Slaughterhouse-Five (1966) by 
Kurt Vonnegut. While this text would rightly be read as the story of Billy Pilgrim, 
time traveling WWII veteran, the text has much more going on underneath the 
silly and heart breaking tale. Specifically, if the reader follows Vonnegut’s animal 
characters, we might gather multiple conclusions that fit in with the overarching 
themes of the text. I include Slaughterhouse-Five because of its consistent respect 
towards living characters, both human and nonhuman. The text acknowledges 
human propensity to see past an animal and instead look at it as a categorical 
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symbol, the animal, while also respecting nonhuman animal lives as subjects. The 
text attempts to acknowledge the lived experience of the animals it represents. 
Throughout the book, the narrator repeats the phrase “so it goes” (6). This phrase 
usually follows the occurrence of death or some sort of intense pain or tragedy. 
However, it is reserved, for the most part, for human tragedies. Yet, as the novel 
progresses, the phrase accompanies death of things other than human, starting 
with animals, moving to “body lice and bacteria and fleas” (84), to even “the 
novel” (205). The text is concerned with death and dying, with who, or what, 
experiences pain and uncertainty as a result of the fragmentation the book follows 
so well. Sensitivity is taken into account here. There are differences between tools 
or machines, like a six-cylinder Chevrolet, and living beings, like the horses the 
American soldiers misuse to the point of extreme physical abuse (196). 
Slaughterhouse Five shows us some of the consequences of misunderstanding 
what a life is and when it matters.  
This is best seen when Billy and Weary are found by the German soldiers: 
“The dog, who had sounded so ferocious in the winter distances, was a female 
German shepherd. She was shivering. Her tail was between her legs. She had been 
borrowed that morning from a farmer. She had never been to war before. She had 
no idea what game was being played. Her name was Princess” (52). The 
acknowledgement of this dog’s, Princess’s, sensitivity and confusion in this 
situation opens the text up to the implications that carry through the rest of the 
text. It is not just the soldiers and civilians that are victims in this war. The 
animals, used as tools, find themselves distraught like Billy does in the sight of all 
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the chaos. Additionally, the narrator takes time to help the reader understand 
Princess enough to realize why this scene matters. As a tool and weapon, dogs can 
be terrifying. One might even use the word uncanny, especially in this scene, 
because dogs like Princess were never trained for such tasks. By calling the 
readers attention towards understanding who Princess is and what she might 
actually be experiencing, the text acknowledges her subjectivity and prompts the 
reader to understand her as a companion and not a symbol or an object of world or 
war making. Understanding how Princess fits into the text helps us understand not 
only the text as a whole, but its other characters, both human and non-human. 
For Slaughterhouse Five, we understand Princess better because of the way she is 
represented. Princess is first represented as the disembodied audible harbinger of 
Billy and Weary’s demise. Yet, once she is fully seen through the words of a 
narrator that represents her as more than what she is in that moment, the reader 
gains an understanding of Princess’s existence outside of the text. Slaughterhouse 
Five best serves as an example of productive representation in the way that it 
depicts both misunderstandings of the dog alongside recognitions of her actual 
lived experience.  
For an example of understanding, I would like to momentarily break from 
literary dog stories and instead turn to Werner Herzog’s documentary Grizzly 
Man (2005). As I have mentioned earlier, understanding a companion animal is 
not so much about getting into their skin and attempting to see from their eyes as 
much as it is involved with cohabitation and communication. Understanding 
comes from living with, not from existing around. In order to properly understand, 
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we must attempt to understand the forms of communication used within a 
natureculture and recognize ourselves as part of it. Understanding, here, is a part 
of the process of “becoming with” and becoming worldly” (Haraway, When 
Species Meet, 3). Timothy Treadwell’s attempt to become a communicating 
member of the natureculture within Katmai National Park and Preserve, as laid 
out in Grizzly Man, gives us a look into what becoming with through 
understanding could look like, in both its triumphs and consequences. 
Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that the medium of the piece, film, 
offers a myriad of other questions concerning animal representations. Rather than 
focus on this, however, I limit my analysis of the documentary to Treadwell’s 
inter-species interactions and the way they are represented. 
  While the story involves primarily humans, bears, foxes, and salmon, I 
find the way the documentary was filmed and then created offers us a valuable 
example of how productive interactions of animals might work to help us 
understand them more adequately. What Timothy Treadwell managed to 
accomplish in Katmai National Park and Preserve was unprecedented and 
amazing, to be sure. His ability to survive at all, let alone amongst bears, testifies 
to the magnitude of this feat. However, as Herzog and the people he interviews 
point out, Treadwell’s stated goals were extremely far from what he was actually 
doing. Instead of protecting them, his presence endangered them and ended in at 
least one of them being killed. Grizzly Man, however, shows us a prime example 
of what Haraway talks about concerning observing animals in When Species 
Meet. Treadwell does what many researchers and scientists have failed to do in 
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the past. He actually lives with these animals rather than beside them. Treadwell’s 
dialogue about the bears is riddled with relational language. Rarely does he make 
any motion towards claiming he can see from the point of view of the bears. He 
does not try to get inside the skin of the bear. He lives with them and meets their 
gaze, instead of observing without ever seeing eye to eye. Treadwell’s 
cohabitation with the animals in Katmai national park seems to resemble, albeit in 
a slightly disturbing way, the methods used by Barbara Smuts that Haraway 
details. Treadwell inducts himself into the natureculture of the area by respecting 
the animals and picking up their social cues. For all his delusions, one would be 
hard pressed to make a convincing argument that he did not actively try to 
understand the animals around him.  
Herzog’s documentary, made from Treadwell’s film, gives the viewer a 
chance to observe the natureculture from a less romanticized perspective. In this 
sense, objectivity does not lead to the same consequences as they might, were 
Herzog to bring his own potentially equally extreme views to a documentary that 
he filmed himself. By juxtaposing Herzog and Treadwell’s almost diametrically 
opposed ideologies, the documentary allowed the viewer to enter into an 
invitational space of understanding rather than an adversarial dialogue. While 
Treadwell’s story ends in a gruesome tragedy, it also shows us the opportunities 
that arise for communication when we seek to meet the gazes of other species 
rather than follow them.  
When we meet the gaze of our companion species, we allow ourselves to 
more appropriately respond. In Travels with Charley: In Search of America 
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(1962), John Steinbeck displays what an appropriate response could look like. He 
responds to Charley, his dog, in a way that shows the degree to which Steinbeck 
has made an attempt to understand his companion. In this non-fictional narrative, 
Steinbeck decides to travel across the continental United States in a camper truck 
with his poodle, Charley. He takes Charley along, he tells us, as a companion. 
Realizing he has been years since he has been anywhere without friends or family, 
Steinbeck realizes his thoughts of danger were actually thoughts of loneliness and 
helplessness. He brings Charley along because “he is a good friend and traveling 
companion, and would rather travel about than anything he can imagine” (9). 
Charley is not just on the trip because Steinbeck needs a figure to cure his 
occasional loneliness; Charley enjoys movement. In addition to Steinbeck taking 
into account what he believes his dog to enjoy, his description of his dog also 
differs significantly from the details we get concerning Buck and Lion’s 
ancestries: “He was born in Bercy on the outskirts of Paris and trained in France, 
and while he knows a little poodle-English, he responds quickly only to 
commands in French. Otherwise he has to translate, and that slows him down” 
(9). When describing what kind of dog he is, we are simply told he is a poodle. 
The stress put on Steinbeck’s description of the dog lies in how he was trained, 
not his ancestry, and how he communicates, rather than how we should see him.  
 Steinbeck takes speaking with his dog very seriously. He tells the reader 
that Charley uses the sound, or word, as Steinbeck calls it, “Ftt”, every time 
Charley “would like to salute a bush or a tree” (24). He uses “Ftt” a few times to 
tell Steinbeck that he is hungry (28). One evening, Charley wakes Steinbeck “with 
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a soft apologetic whining” (176). While using the word apologetic might be 
deemed anthropomorphizing, Steinbeck understands what this whining means: 
“since he [Charley] is not a whining dog I [Steinbeck] got up immediately” (176). 
Knowing the ways his dog communicates, he is able to understand that something 
is not normal. When he I met by an inept, alcoholic veterinarian, Steinbeck gives 
us a piece of his rational behind why he interacts with Charley the way that he 
does:  
I yield to no one in my distaste for the self-styled dog-lover, the kind who 
heaps up his frustrations and makes a dog carry them around . . . . Such 
people, it seems to me, in what they imagine to be kindness, are capable of 
inflicting long and lasting tortures on an animal, denying it any of its 
natural desires and fulfillments until a dog of weak character breaks down 
and becomes the fat, asthmatic, befurred bundle of neuroses. (179) 
While this may not always be the end result of treating adult animals like infants, 
Steinbeck acknowledges one of the most common inappropriate responses many 
of us see. Charley is an adult dog, so Steinbeck will treat him as such and not as a 
human, adult or infant. Charley is not about Steinbeck in the same way that “dogs 
are not about oneself” (Haraway, “The Companion Species Manifesto, 103). He 
resists the same “dangerous and unethical projections” that Haraway urges her 
readers to avoid. Travels with Charley does not display the typical species 
hierarchies we regularly see. Instead, it narrates a human who does not figure his 
relationship to his companion via degrees of subjectivity. Steinbeck tries his best 
to see eye to eye with Charley and give him the response he is due. We see the joy 
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that Haraway details When Species Meet when Steinbeck considers and answers 
the questions: “what if work and play, and not just pity, open up when the 
possibility of mutual response, without names, is taken seriously as an everyday 
practice” (22). In interacting with Charley, Steinbeck gives readers an example of 
what a literary representation of “how animals [can] engage one another’s gaze 
responsively” (Haraway, When Species Meet, 22). The text shows us the positive 
results of responsible and appropriate response. 
 These responses, however, are not without their political implications. 
Engaging with our dogs in this way also implies that we inherit the less savory 
parts of dog-human history and co-evolution. It implies that we must consider the 
act of becoming not just about becoming with dogs, but becoming with other 
animals, both human and non-human. From Steinbeck’s trouble at the US/Canada 
border because of Charley’s presence, to the man in Beaumont who exclaims 
“delightedly . . . ‘Hey, it’s a dog! I thought you had a nigger in there” (251), we 
see, across the US, how humans and dogs interrelate, both personally and 
politically, in ways beyond our initial assumptions. Steinbeck can cross the border 
without any proof of his physical health, while his dog needs confirmation of his 
vaccinations. Multiple passersby in Louisiana almost accost Steinbeck for 
associating with a person of color but are immediately disarmed and even 
delighted when they notice it’s actually a dog. 
 If positive results of taking dog stories and dog-human relationships 
seriously are far reaching, the consequences of failing to do so are equally 
expansive. As we see in Vonnegut, meeting the gaze of dogs and recognizing 
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their lived experience expands our abilities to empathize and provide others with 
the care necessary. But, failing to acknowledge the reality other species face leads 
to the abuse of the horses we see later in the text. As seen in Go Down Moses and 
The Call of the Wild, misunderstanding the lives and reality of dog-lives can lead 
to the perpetuation of reductive systems, such as the natureculture divide, that 
lead to other terrible consequences, such as the deaths of Sam and the Yeehats. 
But, this work is not just about consequences. It is about the possibilities that open 
once we acknowledge those consequences and our past failures and work towards 
more productive kinds of relating. From work to play, there are countless 
opportunities for mutual understanding, love, and joy between our dog 
companions and ourselves.  
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